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Introduction
In the United States, intellectual property (IP) law is intended to
encourage the production of new creative works and inventions.' Copyright
and patent laws do this by providing qualifying authors and inventors with a
bundle of exclusive rights relating to the use and development of their
creations. 2 Importantly, however, these fields differ greatly in the ways that
they determine whether some new creation is sufficiently innovative to
merit legal protection. Copyright law sets the creativity bar especially low
for new works of authorship, whereas patent law demands that a putative
inventor prove that her creation is highly innovative. Although this
difference has been noted repeatedly in the past and explained as a matter of
various differences between copyrightable and patentable subject matter
(including differing goals of the two regimes),3 relatively little research has
focused on whether the different IP thresholds affect the incentives and
behavior of creators.

* Associate Professor and Co-Director of the Center for Empirical Studies of Intellectual
Property, lIT Chicago-Kent College of Law; Visiting Associate Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law.
** Visiting Assistant Professor of Management & Organizations, Kellogg School of
Management, Northwestern University.
*** Professor of Law and Co-Director, Engelberg Center on Innovation Law & Policy, New
York University School of Law.
**** Professor of Law and Co-Director, Engelberg Center on Innovation Law & Policy, New
York University School of Law. The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of

Eric Holmes, Garrett Jaeger, Amanda Levendowski, Amalia Sax-Bolder, Jackie Silverman, and
Christoffer Stromstedt. In addition, we thank Mark Runco for support with Experiment 3. For
unsurpassed comments on drafts and presentations of this research, we thank David Abrams,
Jennifer Arlen, Oren Bar-Gill, Stefan Bechtold, Barton Beebe, Ryan Bubb, Robert Eisenberger,
Richard Epstein, John Ferejohn, Brett Frischmann, Paul Heald, Oskar Liivak, Gregory Mandel,
Jeffrey Rachlinski, Pamela Samuelson, David Schwartz, Catherine Sharkey, Alan Sykes, Melissa
Wasserman, and the attendees of the Texas Law Review Symposium, faculty workshops at
Cardozo, Cornell, and New York University law schools, the Conference on Empirical Legal
Studies, the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, the Society for Economic Research on
Copyright Issues, and Works in Progress in Intellectual Property. The authors are grateful for a
grant from Google that supported this research.
1. See infra subpart I(A).
2. We use the generic term "creation" to cover both copyrightable works of authorship and
patentable inventions.
3. See infra subpart I(B).
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Legal scholarship on the effects of differing IP thresholds on creators
has generally relied on standard economic assumptions about the way that
people respond to incentives. Creators are assumed to be rational and to
respond to increased incentives by producing more and better creations. 4
According to this reasoning, because patent law requires more creativity as
a precondition to the conferral of IP rights compared to what copyright law
requires, creators subject to the patent regime will be encouraged to be
more creative than those subject to the copyright regime.
Recent research in the social sciences, however, suggests that the
connection between incentives and behavior-particularly with regard to
creativity-is not always so straightforward. Although some research
indicates that providing incentives to act creatively has the expected effect
of increasing creativity, other research suggests that offering certain types
of incentives can undermine creative behavior. For example, monetary
incentives to perform creative tasks may dampen creativity. In such cases,
the monetary incentive may create an extrinsic motivation for the behavior
that can "crowd out" the intrinsic motivation to be creative. Moreover, and
importantly for our purposes, increasing the magnitude of an incentive to be
creative may not always lead to more or better behavior. Once creativity
incentives are sufficiently salient or intense, there is a risk that people will
be overly focused on achieving the incentive and "choke."
Of course, the kinds of creativity that IP law deals with are highly
varied.5 The innovative leap associated with designing a graphical user
interface or with developing a new drug may be quite different from
creativity involved in painting or poetry. There may also be differences in
creativity within the separate IP regimes: Although both painting and poetry
are within the domain of copyright law, thinking creatively about line,
shape, and color could be very different from thinking creatively about
diction, meter, and rhyme. Because the cognition associated with these
efforts may be very different, one might think that the effects of thresholds
on creativity could be different as well.
In the series of experiments reported in this Article, we extend the
research on the effects of incentives for creativity into the realm of
intellectual property. Specifically, we test whether the existence of a
creativity threshold that conditions entry into a prize lottery on meeting
certain performance standards affects how creative people are. The
experiments reported here involve various creativity tasks in which subjects
are randomly assigned to conditions that are intended to model the different
creativity thresholds employed by copyright and patent law. Doing so

4. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
5. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1441 (2010) (utilizing the psychology of creativity to analyze the differences in
protectability standards between patent and copyright law).
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allows us to test whether the existence and nature of a threshold increases,
decreases, or does not affect subjects' creativity.
This research contributes to the growing debates about whether
copyright law's creativity threshold is set too low and should be increased
and whether patent law's creativity threshold is appropriately set. In recent
years, some scholars have questioned whether copyright law's creativity
threshold ought to be raised to stimulate the production of works that are
more creative. Other scholars suggest that copyright and patent laws'
respective protection thresholds are more or less properly calibrated in light
of their differing goals.
Although our research cannot answer
comprehensively the question of where to set these laws' thresholds given
the many other significant issues at stake, it is valuable to know whether
"hoisting" copyright's creativity threshold 6 or whether downgrading
patent's creativity threshold would be likely to improve certain kinds of
creativity. More broadly, this research adds to the growing literature in law,
psychology, economics, and management on the effects of incentives on
behavior.7
In Part I, we explain the distinction between the creativity thresholds
employed by copyright and patent laws and the justifications given for the
distinction. We also survey recent suggestions that copyright's low
threshold be raised to promote greater creativity. Part II reviews research
on the study of creativity, including a discussion of preferred creativity
metrics and studies of incentives to act creatively. In Part III, we report
four original experiments designed to measure the effects of different
thresholds on creativity. Three experiments employ different creativity
tasks, and an additional non-creative task serves as a control. Part IV
discusses the implications of our findings for IP law and for creativity and
innovation more generally.
I.

Thresholds in Patent and Copyright Laws

A.

Utilitarianismin Intellectual Property
The Supreme Court, Congress, and many legal scholars consider
utilitarianism the dominant justification for American copyright8 and patent

6. Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality,31 CARDOZo L. REV. 451, 464, 488-89 (2009).
7. For a general background of the issues related to experimental law and economics, see
Jennifer Arlen & Eric L. Talley, Introduction, in EXPERIMENTAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, at xv
(Jennifer Arlen & Eric L. Talley eds., 2008).
8. See, e.g., Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831) (declaring the
purpose of the first U.S. copyright law to be "An Act for the encouragement of learning"); Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (discussing congressional
intent that copyright be a vehicle of free expression and the dissemination of ideas); 122 CONG.
REC. 2834 (1976) (statement of Sen. John McClellan) ("The Constitution makes clear that the
purpose of protecting the rights of an author is to promote the public interest."); Shyamkrishna
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According to utilitarian IP theory, copyright law provides the

incentive of exclusive rights for a limited duration to authors to motivate
them to create culturally valuable works. 10 Without this incentive, the
theory suggests, authors might not invest the time, energy, and money
necessary to create these works because their creations might be copied
cheaply and easily by free riders, eliminating authors' ability to profit from
their works."
Parallel reasoning supports a limited period of exclusive rights that
patent law affords inventors for their technologically or scientifically
valuable inventions. Public benefits accrue by rewarding inventors for
taking two steps they likely would not otherwise have taken: first, to invent,
to the public
and possibly commercialize, and second, to reveal information
2

about these inventions that stimulates further innovation.'

Balganesh, Foreseeabilityand Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1576-77 (2009)
("[C]opyright law in the United States has undeniably come to be understood almost entirely in
utilitarian, incentive-driven terms."); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) (describing the attempt to strike a
balance between the "public good aspect" and private incentives as the central problem of
copyright law).
9. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (indicating that the goal of
patent law is to provide private incentives to ultimately benefit the public through the introduction
of new products to the economy, the creation ofjobs, and betterment of citizens' lives); Sinclair &
Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945) ("The primary purpose of our
patent system is not reward of the individual but the advancement of the arts and sciences.... [I]t
is not a certificate of merit, but an incentive to disclosure."); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Policy Levers in PatentLaw, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1597-99 (2003) (pointing to "[t]he short term
of patent protection, the broad right to prevent independent development of an idea, and the
control patent law can give over products never built or contemplated by the patent owner" as
confirmation that the philosophy behind patent protection is utilitarian); F. Scott Kieff, Property
Rights and Property Rules for CommercializingInventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 697-98 (2001)
("[T]he consensus among those studying the American patent system is to focus on utilitarian
approaches."). Utilitarianism aligns fluently with (and is frequently justified by) the U.S.
Constitution's grant of power to Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Other theories offered to justify
copyright and patent laws include Lockean labor theory and Hegelian personality theory. See
generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011) (questioning the
utilitarian justification for IP rights and offering a new theory, incorporating Kantian theory);
Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745 (2012)
(surveying alternatives to the utilitarian justification for intellectual property protection, including
Hegelian personality theory).
10. Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1197
(1996).
11. E.g., Alina Ng, The Author's Rights in Literary and Artistic Works, 9 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 453, 454 (2009); Wendy J. Gordon, Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar
in Law, Boston University School of Law, Panel Discussion at the Cardozo Intellectual Property
Law Program Symposium: The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too
Long? (Aug. 30, 1999), in 18 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 676-77 (2000) (accepting the
theory of economic incentives for authors under an instrumentalist policy, but arguing its
effectiveness wanes after a certain duration).
12. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 547-49 (2009). Utilitarian
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Fundamentally, utilitarian theories of intellectual property rest on the
premise that the benefit to society of creators crafting valuable works
13

offsets the costs to society of the incentives the law offers to creators.

Because this utilitarian approach establishes a cost-benefit analysis, the
leading
" scholarly analyses of intellectual property have used an economic

ljns.1

Although IP law is generally understood as a mechanism for providing

appropriate incentives to creators, it does not do so directly. Unlike the
provision of prizes or grants, 15 IP law does not directly provide creators

with rewards for producing new works and inventions. Instead, it provides
sets of exclusive rights that potentially provide creators greater returns on
their investments. 16 For example, there are many copyrighted works and
patented inventions that are essentially valueless despite the IP rights that
attach to them.17 In order to be valuable, the works and inventions still

must succeed in the market. Copyrights and patents themselves do not
convey any specific value; they simply make it easier for the owners of

thinking comes in different flavors. One is prospect theory, which suggests that inventors are
rewarded with a patent right to centralize investment in the patented invention's commercialization and improvement, which in turn benefits society. E.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1977). A related theory
advocates for encouraging commercialization because of its valuable role in diffusion of
inventions. E.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 396-97 (2008). Another is the signaling theory, which
proposes that patents are useful signals to financiers that the patenting firm is a worthy
investment. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 636-37, 648 (2002); Gideon
Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 37 (2005).
13. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in IntellectualPropertyLaw, 75 TEXAS
L. REV. 989,996-97 (1997).
14. See, e.g., SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 60-61 (2004) (discussing incentive systems and their role in technological innovation from an economist's
perspective); John P. Conley & Christopher S. Yoo, Nonrivalry and Price Discrimination in
Copyright Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1801, 1805 (2009) (applying an economics-based
public good theory to copyright); F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law
and Economics of Present Patent-ObtainingRules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 59 (2003) (proposing a
model system for patent rules that operates to minimize the social costs of patents); Lemley, supra
note 13, at 994-97 (acknowledging the importance of economic theory in analyzing IP issues).
15. See generally WILLIAM W. FISHER III & TALHA SYED, INFECTION: THE HEALTH CRISIS
IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT (forthcoming 2015),
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/DrugsChapter7.pdf (discussing prize
incentive systems, which reward creators for their creations, and their potential application to the
patent system); Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best
Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 53-55 (Adam B. Jaffe et al.,
eds., 2002) (exploring prize systems and procurement or grant systems, which provide advances
for a creator to finish a commissioned project, as alternatives to the IP system).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 29, 34-35.
17. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Response: Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 GEO. L.J. 2133,
2139 (2012) ("Copyrights are only as valuable as the works to which they are attached, and these
often become economically worthless long before the copyright expires."); Mark A. Lemley &
Carl Shapiro, ProbabilisticPatents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 81 (2005) ("Many patents are virtually
worthless ... because they cover technology that is not commercially important .... ").
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commercially valuable works to thrive in the marketplace by limiting some
forms of competition. 18 Accordingly, one of the key features of how IP law
provides incentives to be creative is the way it structures the mechanisms
by which creations are deemed worthy of rights.1 9 Not every putative work
or invention receives a copyright or patent. 20 As we describe in the
following subpart, only those that clear some creativity threshold menit
protection.
B.

Protectabilityin PatentLaw and Copyright Law
American patent and copyright laws implement utilitarianism in
different ways, 21 and their respective protectability standards are also
strikingly distinct. As this subpart shows, patent law ensures that relatively
few inventions will qualify for protection, as compared with creations that
qualify for protection under copyright law's more permissive standard.
Patent law protects inventions so long as an applicant demonstrates
that his or her invention is novel, useful, and nonobvious.2 2 Patents are
granted after successfully undergoing examination by the Patent and
Trademark Office to ascertain that an invention meets patentability
conditions and the description in the patent application satisfies certain
disclosure requirements.23 The patent right permits the patentee to exclude
others from practicing the invention claimed in the patent for a term of
typically twenty years from the date the patent application was filed.24
Patent law's first requirement for patentability-novelty-requires
principally that the invention was not "patented, described in a printed
publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention., 25 The second
patentability requirement is nonobviousness:

18. See F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE

SOCIETY 3, 3-21

(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
19. Fromer, supra note 5, at 1457-59.
20. See infra subpart I(B).
21. For analyses of some specific difference between the two bodies of law, see, for example,
Fromer, supra note 5, at 1447-49, 1451-53; Jeanne C. Fromer, ClaimingIntellectualProperty,76
U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 720-22 (2009) [hereinafter Fromer, Claiming IP]; Jeanne C. Fromer &
Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251,
1262-73 (2014); Lemley, supra note 13, at 1035-36; Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent
and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465,495 (2004).
22. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2012).
23. Id. § 131. The Patent Act requires disclosure of certain content within the patent by
calling for a written description and enablement. Id. § 112. See generally Fromer, supra note 12
(emphasizing the importance of disclosure for patent law's goals).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a).
25. Id. § 102 (detailing exceptions for certain allowable disclosures, but also disallowing
patents when "the claimed invention was described in a patent.... or in an application for patent
published . . . , in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and
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[A Patent] may not be obtained.., if the differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed
invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective
ordinary skill
filing date of the claimed invention to a person having
6
in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.2
The third requirement is utility, and is most frequently associated with
must have a practical utility, meaning a specific
the idea that an invention
27
and substantial utility.
Contrast this situation with the relative ease of qualifying for copyright
protection. Copyright law safeguards "original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,"
including literary works, sound recordings, movies, and computer software
code.2 8 A copyright holder receives the exclusive right to reproduce the
work, sell copies of it, and prepare derivative works, among other things,2 9
typically until seventy years after the author's death.3 °
The Supreme Court's most recent formulation of the originality
requirement occurred in Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co.,31 a case involving the copyrightability of a local telephone directory
that listed individuals' names in alphabetical order along with their towns
and telephone numbers.32 The Feist Court held that work is original so long
as it "was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from
other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity." 33 The requisite level of creativity, according to the Supreme
Court, "is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice., 3 4 A work
must merely evidence "intellectual production,

. . .

thought, and concep-

tion."3 5 Originality does not rise nearly to patent's requirement of true
novelty; a minimally creative work is protectable even if there is a nearly

was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention").
26. Id. § 103.
27. E.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
28. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a), 117 (2012). To obtain copyright protection, copyright holders
need not do more than create an original work. There is no requirement that a work be published
to be protected. Id. § 102 (requiring only that a work be fixed in "any tangible medium of
expression" to be copyrightable).
29. Id. § 106 (reserving to the copyright owner the exclusive right to reproduce works;
prepare derivative works; distribute works by sale, rental, lease, or lending; perform works
publicly; display works publicly; digitally transmit certain works; and authorize others to exercise
these rights).

30. Id § 302(a).
31. 499 U.S. 340(1991).
32. Id. at 342.
33. Id. at 345.
34. Id. Some older decisions reasoned otherwise, finding that copyright ought to be bestowed
only on very creative works, of the type that "require[] genius for... [their] construction." Jollie
v. Jacque, 13 F. Cas. 910, 913 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7437).
35. Feist,499 U.S. at 362 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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identical work, so long as the other work was not copied.36 As Judge
Learned Hand observed, "[I]f by some magic a man who had never known
it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an
'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though
they might of course copy Keats's., 37 It is thus the rare work that will not
meet the low threshold of originality. For example, the Court held that the
white pages telephone directory at issue in Feist was insufficiently original
because its factual raw data did not owe its existence to the directory creator
and the selection and alphabetical arrangement of the directory entries was
not creative enough.38 The threshold for copyright protection is thus
minimal but not absent.
It is readily apparent that patent law sets a relatively high barrier to
patentability, whereas copyright law sets a relatively low barrier to
copyrightability. 39 This distinction means that a much higher percentage of
works in copyright's realm can qualify for protection than in patent's
realm.4 °
There are various explanations for this stark difference between patent
and copyright laws. One commonly invoked justification is that the
differing protectability standards are justified by the narrower scope of
copyright law and the broader scope of patent law.4 1 Copyright's scope is
narrower than patent's in a few regards, including that copyright law does
not bar independent creation of a protected work while patent law does.
Copyright law also embraces broader defenses to infringement, notably fair
use, that patent law lacks. 42 This narrower scope has resulted in the
argument that we ought to feel comfortable with copyright's more readily
available protection, as culture has continued to develop apace.43 On the
other hand, patent law needs a stricter threshold, the argument goes,
because scientific progress would stall if too many inventions were granted
patent law's broad rights. 44
36. Id. at 345.
37. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936). Others might
copy Keats's poem because any copyright on it has long expired, leaving the work in the public
domain. John C. O'Quinn, ProtectingPrivateIntellectual Propertyfrom Government Intrusion:
Revisiting SmithKline and the Case for Just Compensation, 29 PEPP. L. REv. 435, 504 n.455
(2002).
38. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361-64. As another illustration, the Ninth Circuit held that a lamp

design made up of preexisting parts was not sufficiently original to qualify for copyright
protection. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Seattle Lighting Fixture Co., 345 F.3d 1140, 1146-47 (9th Cir.
2003).
39. Fromer, supra note 5, at 1453.
40. See id.
41. E.g., Dale P. Olson, Copyright Originality,48 Mo. L. REv. 29, 34 (1983).
42. Shira Perlmutter, Freeing Copyrightfrom Formalities, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
565, 587 (1995).
43. Olson, supra note 41, at 34.
44. Id.; see also Fromer, supra note 5, at 1453-54 (criticizing this theory's explanatory
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Alternatively, Paul Goldstein suggests that it is the different goals
underlying copyright and patent laws that lead to the distinct protectability
thresholds. He proposes that "[t]he aim of copyright law is to direct
investment toward the production of abundant information, while the aim of
patent law is to direct investment toward the production of efficient
information." 45 Goldstein reasons that the easily satisfied standard of
originality in copyright law leads to the creation of plenty of artistic
works.4 6 He contrasts that with patent law's stricter requirements of
novelty, nonobviousness, utility, and disclosure, which channel innovators'
energies to create the most effective scientific and engineering inventions.4 7
In prior work one of us provides another explanation: "[T]he
distinctions in the protectability standards governing patent and copyright
law primarily accord with current psychological findings on creativity, even
though it is unlikely that these findings actually motivated the enactment of

power).
45. 1 PAuL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.2.1 (3d ed. 2013).
46. Id.
47. Id. Goldstein suggests another reason for the different standards: an indexing theory. He
claims that "unlike technological advances, which can be classified and indexed to facilitate
efficient searches of the prior art, literary, musical and artistic expression cannot be effectively
classified to enable authors, composers and artists to examine all pertinent prior works to
determine whether their contributions substantially differ from these prior works." Id.at n. 10. On
this reasoning, then, copyright law must have a minimal standard of originality because creators
under copyright's rubric cannot easily ensure that their works are distinct from preceding ones, as
patent law can, thereby allowing stricter standards of novelty and nonobviousness to govern. Cf
Fromer, Claiming IP, supra note 21, at 781-94 (exploring whether copyrighted works might be
claimed more like patented works, alleviating this difficulty).
In a different explanation, Clarisa Long suggests a judgment theory, which bases the
differences in patent and copyright standards on the fact that an invention's characteristics are
ascertainable objectively, while artistic works' characteristics lie in the eye of the beholder. Long,
supra note 21, at 469-70, 487-89. Because artistic works cannot be judged in any objective
fashion, copyright law imposes a subjective standard of originality. Id. at 488. By contrast,
scientific works can be assessed on objective criteria, meriting patent law's objective standards of
novelty, nonobviousness, and utility. Id. at 503; Note, Protecting the Artistic Aspects of Articles
of Utility: Copyright or Design Patent?, 66 HARV. L. REv. 877, 885 (1953). But cf Fromer,
supra note 5, at 1454-55 (criticizing the assumptions on which this theory rests).
John Wiley offers another explanation: a learning theory. He hypothesizes that patent law
requires novelty and nonobviousness because of the imperative for scientists and engineers to
learn what has come before them. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent,58
U. CHI. L. REv. 119, 146 (1991). Patent law requires inventors to review what others in the
domain have already accomplished, thereby producing the opportunity for the inventor to learn
from and build upon the prior art and create something sufficiently different. Id. According to
Wiley, this encouraged process of innovation accords with the notion that scientific and
technological innovation is cumulative. Id. Wiley thinks copyright is different. He indicates that
"[i]t is conventionally desirable for composers to know the literature, but a judge would seem
brazen to assert that excavating musical artifacts was the most efficient way to compose new
music." Id.at 147. Therefore, there is no requirement in copyright law that an artist ensure that
his creation is novel before qualifying for copyright protection. But cf Fromer, supra note 5, at
1456 (criticizing assumptions on which this theory rests).
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these different legal standards. ' 48 When evaluating inventive creativity,
people tend to value large degrees of newness, whereas when evaluating
artistic creativity, people instead prefer some but not too much newness.49
The different thresholds of protectability in patent and copyright law seem
to accord with these differences in the creative emphases.5 °
Despite these arguments in favor of distinct threshold regimes for
copyright and patent laws, some scholars have suggested that copyright
law's protectability threshold ought to be raised, putting it in greater sync
with patent law. Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein propose that the
scope of copyright protection ought to be calibrated to the degree of
originality in the work: the more originality, the more protection. 1
According to Parchomovsky and Stein, copyright law's low threshold sets a
target for creativity that results in creators barely clearing the bar.52 If the
target were set higher, they argue, creators would be incentivized to
produce more creative works.53 Similarly, Joseph Scott Miller argues that
copyright law ought to be structured to "encourag[e] those who experiment
with expression to push against, and even break past, the norms and

48. Fromer, supra note 5, at 1443.
49. Id. at 1471-74, 1479-83.
50. Id. at 1483-1508. David Fagundes and Jonathan Masur explore a related issue, as to the
fact that copyrights vest in authors automatically upon fixation, whereas patents must be granted
by the government after a relatively costly screening process. See David Fagundes & Jonathan S.

Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L.REV. 677, 679 (2012). They suggest that patent
law wisely implements this screen to:
[D]eter[] applicants from seeking patents when the value of the exclusive right is less
than the price of overcoming the screen. Moreover, because of a distinctive
asymmetry in patent law's generation of social and private value, the effect of this
screen is to deter the production only of those low private value patents that also have
low (or negative) social value, Examined in this light, the costly examination process
is not a deadweight loss at all, but an efficient way to exclude the very kind of patents
most likely to generate anticommons concerns.
Id. at 680. By contrast, because copyright protection is much narrower, the presence of copyright
screens as in patent law would be harmful in that they would "deter the creation of works that
have low value for their author but high value for the public-thus precluding production of one
of the paradigmatic kinds of work that copyright was designed to create." Id.
51. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1507 (2009)
("[A]uthors of highly original works will not only receive greater protection, but will also be
sheltered from liability if sued for infringement by owners of preexisting works. Conversely,
creators of minimally original works will receive little protection and incur greater exposure to
liability if sued by others."). Parchomovsky and Stein propose three mechanisms to accomplish
this calibration: a "doctrine of inequivalents" to shelter highly original works from infringing the
works of others, an "added value doctrine" to make infringement remedies dependent on whether
the infringing or initial work has more originality, and a "sameness rule" creating a presumption
of copying when minimally original works accused of infringement are substantively similar to
the initial work. Id at 1523-49.
52. Id. at 1506.
53. Id. at 1517. They write, "The problem with the existing design is that by rewarding
minimally original works and highly original works alike, the law incentivizes authors to produce
works containing just enough originality to receive protection-but not more." Id. at 1506.
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conventions of routine expression that dominate a given genre at a given
time.55' 54 Miller would inject a nonobviousness-like standard into copyright
law.
These proposals share the view that the way to encourage more
creativity is to set the protectability threshold higher. Others, like Erlend
Lavik and Stef van Gompel, have pushed back and argued that it would be
problematic to raise copyright's protectability threshold because of the
difficulty of assessing merit in the cultural domain, and because a raised
standard would in any event be unlikely to perform its filtering function of
protecting only aesthetically or culturally valuable works.56
Conversely, it is rare to find proposals that patent law's protectability
57
standard ought to be diminished, making it more like copyright law's.
Most scholars suggesting changes in patent 58law's protectability standards
suggest ratcheting them up, rather than down.
Key to the arguments by Parchomovsky and Stein and by Miller is the
assumption that increasing the protectability threshold in copyright law will
encourage people to be more creative. If the law sets a higher threshold for
the vesting of rights, people who want those rights will have to be more
creative. Although this assumption seems obviously correct from the
perspective of classical law and economics, recent research in the social
sciences suggests that the reality may be otherwise. We turn now to an
overview of research on incentives and creativity.
II.

Creativity Incentives
IP law's utilitarian theory requires that the law provide people with the
incentive to act creatively, thereby producing something of value to society.
Accordingly, determining the optimal form and level of incentives to spur
creativity is a central issue in IP.59 Although legal scholars are just now
turning increasing attention to this question,6 ° psychologists, sociologists,
and management scientists have long been studying both creativity and the
effects of incentives on creativity. This Part reviews that work. We begin
by canvassing the social-science literature on creativity and incentives.
54. Miller, supranote 6, at 463-64.
55. Id. at 464.
56. Erlend Lavik & Stef van Gompel, On the Prospects of Raising the Originality
Requirement in Copyright Law: Perspectivesfrom the Humanities, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA
387, 423-24 (2013).
57. For one example arguing for diminishing how novelty is assessed in certain complex
fields like biotechnology, see Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in PatentLaw, 60 DUKE L.J.
919, 928-29 (2011).
58. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 175-76

(2004) (decrying the ease with which the PTO has issued patents over the last two decades).
59. For more on this connection between creativity and intellectual property, see Fromer,
supra note 5, at 1457-59.
60. See infra subpart II(B).
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Next, we discuss work by IP scholars that has addressed some of these
issues, and finally, we describe the motivations for the research in this
Article.
A.

Evidence from the Social Sciences
The social-science research on creativity and incentives has expanded
dramatically over the past few decades. We describe some of that research
in this subpart. We first focus on how researchers define and measure
creativity. We then discuss some of their chief findings.
1. Defining and Measuring Creativity.-Although there are varying
colloquial understandings of creativity, 61 the field of psychology consistently defines creativity as a process that generates a product or idea and
possesses two qualities: newness and appropriateness. Newness refers to
novelty or originality, 62 and appropriateness indicates that some community
recognizes the contribution as socially valuable.63 While the creative
process is essentially psychological, the element of appropriateness can be
evaluated only in a sociocultural context.64 As Keith Sawyer explains:
"Individual-level explanations are the most important component of the
explanation of creativity ....But individuals always create in contexts,
and a better understanding of those contexts is essential to a complete
explanation of creativity., 65 Assessing creativity is not complete without
reference to a work's effect on the relevant culture and its social

61. The term "creativity" came into common usage only after World War II. ROBERT PAUL
WEINER, CREATIVITY & BEYOND: CULTURES, VALUES, AND CHANGE 5 (2000). Although its
etymological root, "create" (derived from the Latin creatio or creams), was in long use, the noun
"creativity" was first used in the late nineteenth century as people sought a term to represent a
common quality that transcends the specific artistic and scientific domains. Id. at 8, 89 (reciting
the first usage by Adolfus William Ward in his History of DramaticEnglishLiterature to describe

Shakespeare's "poetic creativity").
62. We use the terms "novelty" and "originality" here in their lay sense rather than their legal
sense, see suprasubpart I(B).
63. E.g., MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI,

CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF

DISCOVERY AND INVENTION 25, 28-29 (1996) (defining creativity as a novel product that is
accepted into a domain); R. KEITH SAWYER, EXPLAINING CREATIVITY: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN
INNOVATION 27 (2d. 2012) (understanding creativity to involve both novelty and social value to
some community); Howard E. Gruber & Doris B. Wallace, The Case Study Method and Evolving
Systems Approach for Understanding Unique Creative People at Work, in HANDBOOK OF

CREATIVITY 93, 94 (Robert J. Steinberg ed., 1999) ("Like most definitions of creativity, ours
includes novelty and value: The creative product must be new and must be given value according
to some external criteria."); Robert J. Sternberg & Todd I. Lubart, The Concept of Creativity:
Prospects andParadigms,in HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY supra at 3, 3 (defining creativity as "the

ability to produce work that is both novel (i.e., original, unexpected) and appropriate (i.e., useful,
adaptive concerning task constraints)").
64. SAWYER, supra note 63, at 209.
65. Id.
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judgments. 66 According to Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's influential framework, creativity can be appraised only at the intersection of individuals, the
domain in which they are working, and the field (the domain's gatekeepers). 67 In a sense, the socio-psychological definition of creativity looks
similar to IP law's aim of giving protection for products that are requisitely
new, while leaving to society the question of how valuable the product
ought to be considered.
It is one thing to explain what creativity is, but it is another thing to be
able to measure it validly and reliably. Psychologists have made enormous
strides over the past few decades in crafting scientific techniques to do so.
A 1989 review of creativity studies found 255 different tests in use,68 but
subsequent research has considerably narrowed the scope of appropriate
procedures. 69 Depending on what one is trying to measure-whether a
product is creative, whether a person is creative, or whether a thought
process is creative--different kinds of tests may be more appropriate than
others. 70 When measuring the creativity of a product-something quite
relevant to IP law-one favored approach involves consensual agreement
among judges that the product has certain features, such as originality,
usefulness, or value.71 In some instances, expert judges will be appropriate,
while in others lay judges provide equally valid results. 72 The virtue of the
consensual agreement technique is that it does not rely on any specific
theory of creativity, and it tends to model the way that creativity is assessed
in the real world (that is, people simply judge products or ideas to be
not unguided by sophisticated academic theories of what makes
creative or
73
them so).

66. See CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 63, at 6 (noting that an essential prerequisite for
creativity is "a culture that contains symbolic rules"); Joseph Kasof, Explaining Creativity: The
Attributional Perspective, 8 CREATIVITY RES. J. 311, 313 (1995) (noting the importance of
situational factors such as culture in assessing creativity).
67. CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 63, at 6, 27-30.
68. E. Paul Torrance & Kathy Goff, A Quiet Revolution, 23 J. CREATIVE BEHAV. 136, 143
tbl.l (1989).
69. For a review of major areas of creativity research, see Arthur J. Cropley, Defining and
Measuring Creativity: Are Creativity Tests Worth Using?, 23 ROEPER REv. 72 (2000).
70. See id.
71. See Beth A. Hennessey, The Consensual Assessment Technique: An Examination of the
Relationship Between Ratings of Process and Product Creativity, 7 CREATIVITY RES. J. 193, 201
(1994) (finding interrater reliability levels of 0.93 among untrained undergraduate raters); see also
Teresa M. Amabile, Social Psychology of Creativity: A ConsensualAssessment Technique, 43 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 997, 1011-12 (1984) (proposing a subjective-assessment
methodology to "produce clear and reliable subjective judgments of creativity").
72. Amabile, supranote 71, at 1006; Hennessey, supranote 71, at 194.
73. John Baer & Sharon S. McKool, Assessing Creativity Using the Consensual Assessment
Technique, in RESEARCH ON ASSESSMENT TECHNOLOGIES, METHODS, AND APPLICATIONS IN

HIGHER EDUCATION 65, 67 (Christopher Schreiner ed., 2009).

1934

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 92:1921

Perhaps the most widely used creativity tests are those that measure
"divergent thinking. 74 Divergent thinking refers to a person's ability to
generate a multitude of ideas to an open-ended question.75 For example,
subjects might be asked to think of unusual uses of a tin can. Answers to
these tests, which E.P. Torrance pioneered, are frequently scored according
to fluency (number of answers provided), originality (novelty or rarity of
answers), and flexibility (a measure of the different fields or categories
from which the answers come). 76 Divergent thinking matches well with the
ideas of "problem finding" and "problem solving" in creativity.77
Divergent-thinking tasks have been used in a wide variety of experimental
settings, and they have been studied as predictive measures of
entrepreneurship.78
In addition, "convergent thinking" can also exhibit creativity. 79 Unlike
divergent thinking, which involves generating multiple answers to an openended task, convergent thinking leads toward just one or a few correct
answers. 80 But the narrow range of possible answers does not eliminate the
role of creativity.8 1 Even when there is a single optimal answer to a
problem, the method of determining the solution may not be apparent and
may rely on more than simple algorithmic cognition or memory retrieval.82
Convergent creative thinking is often tested with so-called "insight
problems," that measure how quickly and accurately subjects can deduce
the correct answer. 83 Accordingly, non-algorithmic convergent thinking
aligns well with the notion of creativity as "problem solving" discussed
above.

74. See generally DIVERGENT THINKING AND CREATIVE POTENTIAL (Mark A. Runco ed.,
2013) (describing divergent-thinking theories and tests for creative-thinking potential).
75. See generally id.
76. See Mark A. Runco et al., Information, Experience, and Divergent Thinking: An
Empirical Test, 18 CREATIVITY RES. J. 269, 269 (2006).
77. Id; see also Mark A. Runco & Shawn M. Okuda, Problem Discovery, Divergent
Thinking, and the Creative Process, 17 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 211, 217 (1988) (finding
divergent thinking to be consistent with developmental views of problem finding).
78. Michael Ames & Mark A. Runco, Predicting Entrepreneurshipfrom Ideation and
Divergent Thinking, 14 CREATIVITY & INNOVATION MGMT. 311, 312 (2005).
79. Cropley, supra note 69, at 73 (recognizing that creativity rests on both divergent and
convergent thinking).
80. Arthur Cropley, In Praise ofDivergent Thinking, 18 CREATIVITY RES. J. 391, 391 (2006).
81. Id at 395-99.
82. See id.at 399 tbl.3 (listing numerous types of convergent-thinking processes that enable
the thinker to determine a singular solution by both generating and exploring variability).
83. See, e.g., Robert W. Weisberg, Problem Solving and Creativity, in THE NATURE OF
CREATIVITY: CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 148, 151-53 (Robert J. Steinberg
ed., 1988) (discussing perhaps the most famous such creativity task involving convergent
thinking, the task of attaching a candle to the wall using only a book of matches and a box of
tacks).
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The kinds of creativity and innovation that are covered by IP law span
the various processes and modes of cognition discussed above, although
almost all of them will incorporate aspects of both divergent and convergent
thinking.8 4 Abstract painting likely involves mostly divergent thinking and
computer programming can be a matter of non-algorithmic convergent
thinking, but almost all creative fields require both the generation of novel
or unusual responses as well as judgments about whether they are
appropriate.85 Accordingly, in the experiments reported below, we test the
effects of creativity thresholds on both divergent and non-algorithmic
convergent thinking.
2. Motivation, Incentives, and Creativity.-IP law exists to motivate
creativity, 86 so understanding the relationship between motivation and
creativity is essential. People can be motivated to create for a variety of
reasons, but psychologists generally distinguish two classes of motivation:
extrinsic and intrinsic.87 Extrinsic motivation is motivation to engage in an
activity that comes from a source that is external to the individual, such as
88
payment of money, evaluation from a third party, or surveillance.
Intrinsic motivation, by contrast, is motivation that comes purely from a
person's intrinsic enjoyment of or interest in the activity at hand.89
As IP scholars, we are interested in the interactions between intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation. To varying degrees, the kinds of creativity that IP
law deals with involve both kinds of motivation. Creators and inventors
have manifold intrinsic and extrinsic reasons for engaging in their work. 90
To these existing reasons, IP law adds an additional extrinsic motivator: the
opportunity to receive formal rights that potentially increase economic
returns on creativity. We are interested in how the addition of differently
structured external incentives affect creators' underlying effort and
motivation.
From a classical economic perspective, the answer is simple:
Motivation is motivation, and more of it is better. In order for a person to
do something, she needs to have incentives that exceed the costs of

84. See Fromer, supra note 5, at 1477 (considering the view that convergent thinking is
important to innovation in the sciences and divergent thinking important in the arts).
85. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
87. Edward L. Deci, Intrinsic Motivation, Extrinsic Reinforcement, and Inequity, 22 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 113, 113 (1972).
88. Teresa M. Amabile et al., Social Influences on Creativity: The Effects of Contracted-for
Reward, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 14, 15 (1986); Deci, supra note 87, at 113.
89. Deci, supra note 87.
90. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace
Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 513, 522-36 (2009) (discussing various intrinsic and

extrinsic motivations of creation).
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engaging in the behavior. 91 Perhaps she experiences some sense of internal
pleasure or a warm glow when performing the task. Or perhaps she is paid
a certain amount of money to perform the task. As long as the benefit she
receives exceeds the cost of performing the task, she can be expected to
engage in it. Moreover, the more incentives she receives, the better her
performance. To an economist, the nature of the motivation does not
matter, only its level does.92
On this view, extrinsic and intrinsic
motivations are substitutable for one another, and the addition of extrinsic
motivation to an already intrinsically motivated person should increase
motivation and performance. 93 As Dan Ariely and others explain, "[t]he
expectation that increasing performance-contingent incentives will improve
performance rests on two subsidiary assumptions: (1) that increasing
performance-contingent incentives will lead to greater motivation and effort
and (2) that this increase in motivation and effort will result in improved
performance. 94
Over the past several decades, however, experimental social-science
research has significantly complicated this otherwise simple story. Despite
general findings that extrinsic incentives tend to enhance performance on
tasks that are algorithmic (simple or straightforward), 95 many studies
suggest otherwise with regard to the effect of incentives to complete
creative tasks. Some studies suggest that intrinsic and extrinsic incentives
for creativity aren't always substitutable and that the provision of greater
creativity incentives does not always result in more or better performance.9 6
To understand the interrelationship between motivation, creativity, and
incentives, psychologists examine the effects of intrinsic motivation and
extrinsic motivation on creativity. Some psychologists' studies find that

91. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 20 (2003) (discussing investments that yield social benefits in
excess of costs as desirable).
92. See Roland Bdnabou & Jean Tirole, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, 70 REV. ECON.
STUD. 489, 489 (2003) (implying that economists have neglected psychological research showing
that incentives can undermine performance).
93. See Deci, supra note 87, at 113-14 (assessing impact of different extrinsic motivations
upon intrinsically motivated people).
94. Dan Ariely et al., Large Stakes and Big Mistakes, 76 REV. ECON. STUD. 451, 451 (2009).
95. See Kenneth 0. McGraw, The Detrimental Effects of Reward on Performance: A
Literature Review and a Prediction Model, in THE HIDDEN COSTS OF REWARD: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN MOTIVATION 33, 55-57 (Mark R. Lepper &

David Greene eds., 1978) (summarizing study results and finding that rewards are least disruptive
when the task is adversive to the subject and algorithmic).
96. See generally Robert Gibbons & John Roberts, Economic Theories of Incentives in
Organizations,in THE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS 56, 90-91 (Robert Gibbons
& John Roberts eds., 2013) (discussing the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic incentives as
posited by Bnabou & Tirole). Roland Bdnabou & Jean Tirole respond to the psychological
results showing that incentives can harm creativity by building an economic model that
incorporates these psychological insights and shows why they can be rational. B6nabou & Tirole,
supra note 92.
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intrinsic motivation is more conducive to creativity than extrinsic
motivation.97 These studies typically investigate overjustification: having
subjects engage in a task that they already might like to do with the promise
of extrinisic reward.98 Subjects engage in a creative task, 99 such as drawing
or collage making or puzzle solving. Some are told that they will receive a
reward for performance, while others are not. 100 In these situations, those
subjects acting with reward expectation are judged to produce significantly
less creative work than those acting without reward expectation. 10 1
Psychologists posit that those who are extrinsically motivated will be less
creative because they will act more conventionally-to avoid taking risk-

97. Teresa M. Amabile, How To Kill Creativity, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 77, 79.
98. Teresa M. Amabile, Effects of External Evaluation on Artistic Creativity, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 221, 222 (1979).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. E.g., id.at 222 (discussing experimental results showing that rewarded subjects produced
less creative responses than those not rewarded for participation); Regina Conti et al., The Positive
Impact of Creative Activity: Effects of Creative Task Engagement and Motivational Focus on
College Students 'Learning, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1107, 1109 (1995) (noting
that "salient extrinsic motives, such as focusing on external evaluation, have been found to
undermine ... creativity"); Beth A. Hennessey, The Effect of Extrinsic Constraintson Children's
Creativity While Using a Computer, 2 CREATIVITY RES. J. 151, 165 (1989) (describing
experimental results showing that rewards given by a computer negatively affected the creativity
of children participating in the study); cf Ariely et al., supra note 94, at 454-67 (showing that
"relatively high monetary incentives can have perverse effects on performance" for cognitively
intense tasks, like creative ones). Relatedly, psychological studies systematically demonstrate that
extrinsic motivation decreases subjects' intrinsic interest in a creative task. Amabile, supra note
98, at 229; Hennessey, supra. Edward Deci has refined this work by showing that some extrinsic
motivators, like money, decrease intrinsic motivation, while others, such as verbal reinforcement
and positive feedback, actually enhance intrinsic motivation. Edward L. Deci, Effects of
Externally Mediated Rewards on IntrinsicMotivation, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105,
114 (1971); Deci, supra note 87, at 113-18. They attribute their engagement in the task to the
extrinsic motivation rather than any intrinsic motivation they might otherwise have had. Amabile
et al., supra note 88, at 14. This effect might be due to the external motivation drawing the
subjects' attention away from vaguer-but present-intrinsic motivations. See id. at 17-19
(verifying this explanation experimentally). Or the external motivation might lead subjects to
view the task as a means to an end rather than an end in and of itself. Id at 15. In fact, a number
of management studies, including some focused on particular industries like open-source software,
find that intrinsic motivation is the principal motivation articulated by industry participants for
their work. E.g., Jurgen Bitzer et al., IntrinsicMotivation in Open Source Software Development,
35 J. COMP. ECON. 160, 167 (2007) (finding that "the fun of programming is a major motivational
driver" for open source software programmers); Karim R. Lakhani & Robert G. Wolf, Why
Hackers Do What They Do: UnderstandingMotivation and Effort in Free/Open Source Software
Projects, in PERSPECTIVES ON FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 3 (J. Feller et al. eds., 2005)
("We find.., that enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation-namely, how creative a person feels
when working on the project-is the strongest and most persuasive driver."); cf Henry Sauermann
& Wesley M. Cohen, What Makes Them Tick?: Employee Motives and Firm Innovation, 56
MGMT. SCI. 2134, 2134 (2010) ("We find [m]otives regarding intellectual challenge,
independence, and money have a strong positive relationship with innovative output, whereas
motives regarding job security and responsibility tend to have a negative relationship.").
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and will be more focused on the extrinsic motivation rather than the creative
process itself.102
Despite this line of findings, there are other studies that suggest that
extrinsic rewards do not always undermine creativity and can, in fact,
enhance it. For one thing, studies by behavioral psychologists tend to find
that providing reward-external motivation-increases subjects' creative
performance with regard to whatever aspect
the subject is being told will be
03
judged (such as originality or fluency).
Meta-analysis of these two strands of studies reconcile them by
proposing that the latter set of studies instructs subjects specifically how (or
with regard to which aspect) to perform creatively and the extrinsic reward
then helps enhance creativity, whereas the former set of studies does not
give specific instructions, resulting in the extrinsic reward decreasing
creativity.10 4 Moreover, when studies control for both whether specific
instructions to perform creatively are provided and whether reward is
provided, guidance as to performance metrics seems to explain the
difference in the effect of reward. 10 5 The theory is that when subjects are
not instructed on how to perform specifically on a creative task, they are
risk averse and choose conventional solutions to the task at hand, which is
detrimental to creativity.' 0 6 But when subjects are told the metric by which
they will be judged on their creativity, they strive to do well on that
metric-going beyond obvious approaches to the task-when there is a
reward. 107 These results suggest that when it is possible to specify how to

102. Amabile, supra note 98, at 222. For similar reasons, extrinsically motivated individuals
tend to perform better on conventional, algorithmic tasks precisely because there is a
straightforward path to completing the task. Id. (citing McGraw, supra note 95).
103. E.g., John Glover & A.L. Gary, Proceduresto Increase Some Aspects of Creativity, 9 J.
APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 79 (1976) (finding this to be the case for a verbal creativity task in
which points were awarded for fluency (number of different responses), flexibility (number of
verb forms), elaboration (number of words per response), and originality (statistical infrequency
of verb forms)).
104. Robert Eisenberger & Linda Shanock, Rewards, Intrinsic Motivation, and Creativity: A
Case Study of Conceptual and Methodological Isolation, 15 CREATMviTY RES. J. 121, 121-25
(2003); see also Amabile, supra note 98, at 223 (citing McGraw, supra note 95).
105. Amabile, supra note 98, at 223-32 (studying this question with regard to collage making,
but finding that those who received both extrinsic motivation and a general instruction to focus
specifically on creativity-without more guidance-performed less creatively than those who got
the same instruction but no extrinsic motivation). How specific this instruction to be creative need
be is a matter of debate among psychologists. Compare id. (finding that those who received both
extrinsic motivation and a general instruction to focus specifically on creativity-without more
guidance-performed less creatively than those who got the same instruction but no extrinsic
motivation), with Robert Eisenberger et al., Can the Promiseof RewardIncrease Creativity?, 74 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 704, 709-12 (1998) (showing through experiments that simply
instructing subjects that they will be rewarded for unusual drawings along with a basic
clarification about the task-rather than being given no such instruction-enhances creativity).
106. Amabile, supra note 98, 228.
107. Id at 230-31.
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08
perform creatively, it is worth doing so along with providing a reward.1
Indeed, some studies show an increase in intrinsic motivation-rather than
a decrease-when subjects are offered a reward and are instructed to
perform creatively.10 9 Ultimately, however, one cannot simply assume that
the addition of an incentive to an already motivated person will always
yield more or better creative production.
Other studies suggest that the specific structure of the reward affects
whether it may decrease creativity, increase it, or have no effect." 0 Related
studies show that rewards that are contingent on a subject's task
performance do not undermine intrinsic task interest as much as rewards
that are contingent only on a subject's completion of a task."'
Separate from the question of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are
issues about the magnitude and structure of creativity incentives. Just as
classical economic theory predicts that adding external motivation to
internal motivation increases total motivation, so too does it predict that
higher magnitude incentives produce greater motivation and performance
than lower magnitude incentives. Recently, Dan Ariely and others have
studied the effects of particular magnitudes of performance-contingent
rewards on task performance." 2 Ariely and his co-investigators studied
subjects in both the United States and rural India performing a variety of

108. Id. But see id. at 231-32 (noting, however, that such instruction is not always possible).
109. Eisenberger et al., supra note 105. Another aspect for which the studies showing
reward's detrimental effect on creativity might be inapplicable is with regard to professionals.
The studies discussed above focus on nonprofessionals. Psychologists speculate that the results
might look different for professionals: According to Amabile, "While we might expect that some
professional scientists or artists could succumb to the overjustification effect, it seems eminently
clear that many highly creative people go on being creative in the face of numerous extrinsic
constraints." Amabile, supra note 98, at 232. She theorizes that professional scientists and artists
internalize how their work will be judged, and as a result, external motivators have less of an
effect on them (at least detrimentally). Id. In addition, their intrinsic motivation is strong-likely
much stronger than nonprofessional subjects-and overjustification is less likely to affect them
than those whose "internal states are ambiguous or nonsalient." Id. In fact, empirical work bears
this out. In an archival study, Dean Simonton finds no significant relationship between the
creative productivity of ten classical composers at various points in their lives and the external
motivation-such as honorary degrees-they received during those points. Dean Keith Simonton,
Creative Productivity, Age, and Stress: A Biographical Time-Series Analysis of 10 Classical
Composers, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 791, 801-03 (1977).
110. See generally Emir Kamenica, Behavioral Economics and Psychology of Incentives, 4
ANN. REV. ECON. 427 (2012) (reviewing "empirical findings on anomalous impacts of incentives"
and suggesting that "a coherent set of principles can improve the design of incentive structures in
a variety of settings").
111. Judy Cameron & W. David Pierce, The Debate About Rewards andIntrinsicMotivation:
Protests and Accusations Do Not Alter the Results, 66 REV. EDUC. RES. 39, 39-40 (1996); Robert
Eisenberger & Judy Cameron, Detrimental Effects of Reward: Reality or Myth?, 51 AM.
PSYCHOL. 1153, 1155 (1996); David Rosenfield et al., When Rewards Reflect Competence: A
Qualification of the Overiustification Effect, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 368, 374
(1980).
112. Ariely et al., supra note 94.
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tasks-based on creativity, cognition, memory, or motor skills-for which3
the magnitude of reward varied from low to moderate to very high."
Payment in each condition depended on performance of the task.' 4 For
example, in one reported experiment, subjects would receive full payment if
performance was very good, half payment if performance was merely good,
and no payment if performance did not qualify as good." 5 Across the
various experiments, Ariely and the others found that subjects offered low
to moderate levels of reward outperformed those offered the very high level
of reward.1 6 They also found that the propensity to choke on a task due to
increasing reward was frequently task specific and not just based on
individual characteristics. 17 The authors suggest that these results are
consistent with the idea that "beyond an optimal level of arousal for
executing tasks, further increases in arousal can lead to a decrement in
performance. ' 18 Importantly and surprisingly, however, the authors did
not find variation between tasks involving creativity and those that did not
in the study in rural India. The highest incentive level undermined
performance in each case.
Relatedly, Katharina Eckartz and others recently investigated the effect
of incentives on creativity using three different incentive schemes: a flat
fee, a linear payment, and a tournament.' 19 They presented subjects with a
set of letters and asked them to construct as. many words as they could
within five minutes. 20 For each word, participants received a score that
was more than proportionally increasing given the number of letters in the
word.'12 They also used an IQ task and a number-adding task as control
tasks. 122 Contrary to nearly all of the other studies described above, they
found that the choice of incentive had no significant effect on performance
for any of the three tasks; rather, they found that "performance depends
almost entirely on individual characteristics of participants and can, on the

113. Id at 454-67. For example, the levels of payment in rural India were 4, 40, and 400
Indian Rupees, respectively, in the low, high, and very high conditions. Id. at 454. The payment
in the high-incentive treatment is close to the monthly per capita consumer expenditure in the

region. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 454-67. One important exception was the only motor-skills task given to subjects
in the United States, wherein performance increased the higher the offered reward was. Id. at 462.
117. Id. at 463.
118. Id.
at 467.
119. Katharina Eckartz et al., How Do Incentives Affect Creativity? 6 (Ifo Inst. Center for
Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 4049, 2012), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2198760.
120. Id. at 4.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 5-6.
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aggregate level, hardly be influenced through incentives.' ' 2 3 More
specifically, they found "[i]ndividual characteristics explain for all tasks
more than 60% of the observed variance in the performance. The presence
or absence of different incentive schemes
explain for all tasks in this
124
experiment less than 1%of the variance."'
Perhaps most relevant to our questions is research on the effects of
goals and thresholds on performance. In many areas of life and law,
performance is not measured precisely but rather by whether or not it meets
certain thresholds. For example, payment bonuses may be given out when
employees meet certain thresholds in terms of hours worked or dollars
billed. 125 Additional bonuses kick in at each new threshold level rather than
being smoothly distributed throughout the spectrum of performance. In the
legal setting, three-strikes laws, zero-tolerance policies, and drunk-driving
laws based on blood-alcohol limits structure negative incentives (punishments) as binary thresholds. 26 Tiered incentive structures like these can
produce various distortions in individuals' performance.
On the one hand, empirical research suggests that creation of
performance goals generally leads to improved performance, because goals
tend to increase people's effort, persistence, and attention. 127 Relative to
people without explicit goals, those with goals tend to perform better on a

123. Id.at 17.
124. Id. Competition is a factor whose presence might lead to different results. Some studies
suggest that competition can undermine intrinsic motivation, which might diminish creative
performance. See Edward L. Deci et al., When Trying To Win: Competition and Intrinsic
Motivation, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 79, 79 (1981) (presenting experiment
results that indicate competition reduces intrinsic motivation); cf Oriana Bandiera et al., Social
Preferencesand the Response to Incentives: Evidencefrom Personnel Data, 120 Q.J. ECON. 917,
917 (2005) (finding that "the productivity of the average worker is at least 50 percent higher under
piece rates than under relative incentives," pursuant to which "individual effort imposes a negative
externality on others").
Further experimental work shows, however, that competition's
deleterious effect on intrinsic motivation and furthermore on creative performance obtains only
for those individuals low in achievement orientation. John M. Tauer & Judith M. Harackiewicz,
Winning Isn't Everything: Competition, Achievement Orientation,and Intrinsic Motivation, 35 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 209, 236-37 (1999). Individuals high in achievement orientation
retain high levels of intrinsic motivation and perform creatively even in the face of competition.
Id
125. See Paul Healy, The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions, 7 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 85, 85 (1985) (noting that "[e]amings-based bonus schemes are a popular means of
rewarding corporate executives"). See generally Darren Grant, The Essential Economics of
Threshold-Based Incentives: Theory and Estimation (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.shsu.edu/-dpg006/wsl00.pdf (presenting an empirical study on the economics of
threshold-based incentives).
126. Cf David Friedman & William Sjostrom, Hanged for a Sheep: The Economics of
MarginalDeterrence, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 345 (1993) (examining the risk that a high punishment
for one crime may lead an offender to commit a worse crime instead).
127. EDWIN A. LOCKE & GARY P. LATHAM, A THEORY OF GOAL SETTING AND TASK
PERFORMANCE 27-29 (1990).
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variety of different tasks involving physical, cognitive, and creative
performance. 128
On the other hand, the existence of certain kinds of achievement
thresholds can negatively affect performance. For example, if a threshold
creates a binary distinction between those who reach it and those who do
not, and if all who reach the threshold receive the same reward, people are
likely to behave differently than if performance is smoothly rewarded.
Imagine three people, A, B, and C, who are trying to perform a task that is
rewarded by achieving a binary threshold and for whom performance is
costly. A has low talent and, thus, no chance of reaching the threshold. B
has medium talent and may be able to reach the threshold. C has high talent
and can reach the threshold easily. A will likely realize that he cannot reach
the threshold and will simply not bother to perform since performance is
costly. For B, the threshold may create a goal that incentivizes her to
commit more effort to the task, resulting in higher performance than if the
threshold was not provided. C, however, can easily reach the threshold and
will thus not be motivated to invest more effort in performing the task to
achieve beyond the threshold, resulting in lower performance than if the
threshold was not provided. Accordingly, thresholds can produce performance distortions that result in clustering or "piling up" around the
threshold. 129 People are motivated to barely achieve the threshold but no
more. 13 Clustering may be reduced, however, when the threshold is uncertain. If people do not know precisely where the threshold is set, they
may be risk averse and perform better in an attempt to ensure satisfaction of
the threshold.
A variety of empirical studies support these inferences. For example,
ultramarathoners tend to cluster around significant performance measures
like completing the race in under twenty-four or thirty hours. 131 Especially
at the higher achievement end, some runners will tend to underperform
because they are satisfied with meeting the threshold rather than expending
more energy to get a better (but not necessarily rewarded) time.' 32 This is
also true for those who run the more reasonable distance of 26.2 miles, a
cross section much closer demographically to the general population. In an
analysis of almost 9.4 million marathon finishing times across nearly 7,000
marathons between the years 1970-2013, Eric Allen and colleagues find

128. George Wu et al., A Prospect Theory Model of Goal Behavior 1 (Apr. 22, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/george.wu/research/papers
/wu% 2 0heath%201arrick%20(prospect/2Otheory%2Omodel%20ofo2Ogoal%20behavior).pdf.
129. Id. at 15-19.

130. Id.
131. Grant, supra note 125, at 11.
132. As Grant notes, "This is the ultimate irony of the Western States 100: in one of the
toughest endurance races in the world, most finishers choose not to use up all the gas in the tank."

Id. at2.
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massive piling-up effects. 133 Times just missing half-hour marks (such as
4:01) are observed far less often, and times just making half-hour marks
(such as 3:59) are observed3 4far more often than should be if the times were
more normally distributed.
All in all, we face a murky picture of the relationship between
incentives and creativity. A series of studies suggests that rewardsparticularly higher ones-can undermine creativity, but other studies
indicate that carefully designed rewards and instructions can instead
enhance creativity.
B.

Incentives and Creativity in IP Research

In recent years, a handful of legal scholars have made reference to
social-science studies finding that incentives can harm creativity. Some
scholars have argued that, as a general matter, IP law's approach to
incentives is incorrect. For example, Julie Cohen argues that copyright law
plays little or no role in actually motivating creators. She writes:
Everything we know about creativity and creative processes suggests
that copyright plays very little role in motivating creative work.
Creative people are much more apt to describe what they do as the
product of desire, compulsion, or addiction, and to understand
particular results as heavily
influenced by cultural, intellectual, and
35
emotional serendipity.'

To Cohen and others, 136 most copyright creators have sufficient
intrinsic incentives to create, and additional copyright incentives are unnecessary and wasteful.
Other scholars go further and argue that, consistent with the research
discussed above, IP law's incentives may actually undermine creativity.
133. Eric J. Allen et al., Reference-Dependent Preferences: Evidence from Marathon Runners
3, 9 (Dec. 30, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), availableat http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/devin
.pope/research/pdf/WebsiteMarathons.pdf
134. Id. at 3. Furthermore, the "excess mass" cannot fully be explained by the "extrinsic
benefit" of qualifying for the Boston Marathon. Id. at 8, 18.
135. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-IndustrialEconomy: A Research
Agenda, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 141, 143. Cohen goes on to propose that copyright should instead be
used to "enable the provision of capital and organization so that creative work may be exploited,"
so that it "creates a foundation for predictability in the organization of cultural production,
something particularly important in capital-intensive industries like film production." Id.
136. Relatedly, some scholars suggest that people will readily create in reliance on their
intrinsic motivation, without regard to extrinsic motivations, such as IP-related incentives. E.g.,
Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 42634 (2002); Tushnet, supra note 90, at 513 (exploring "the ways in which the desire to create can
be excessive, beyond rationality, and free from the need for economic incentive," and suggesting
as a result that copyright law should not "treat[] creative activity as a product of economic
incentives"); see also YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 92-99 (2006) (analyzing different models for
motivation, including "intrinsic motivation").
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For example, Diane Zimmerman asks legal scholars to wrestle with the
legal implications of findings that "the promise of monetary or other
extrinsic rewards for creative activities can actually diminish rather than
enhance the likelihood that individuals will be induced to produce highquality new work.' ' 137 Eric Johnson suggests that, although there might be
some exceptions, "[i]n general, the kind of creativity and innovation that
benefits society as a whole is not in need of externally supplied
incentives. '' 138 In reliance on this body of literature, Johnson speculates that
patent and copyright laws might be counterproductive-or at best
unnecessary-for individuals. 139 Similarly, Gregory Mandel worries that
"law's ability to promote creativity not only may be limited, but could even
be detrimental, to the extent it turns an artist's or inventor's internally
motivated activity into one conducted for the copyright or patent prize. 14 °
Nonetheless, Mandel leaves open the possibility that IP laws might enhance
creativity:
To the extent intellectual property law is perceived as creating
competition, constraint, or providing rewards for task (not creative)
performance, the law may produce extrinsically motivated efforts
that are less creative. To the extent, however, that intellectual
property law is perceived as providing potential creators with a wide
degree of autonomy and a reward for creative achievement,
the law
41
can produce intrinsic motivation that enhances creativity.1
To Zimmerman, Johnson, and Mandel, IP laws may be not only
socially wasteful expenditures on creativity that would have been produced
anyway; IP laws may actually be inhibiting the very creativity that they
exist to promote.
Aside from Mandel's work and Johnson's intimation, there has been
very little discussion in the legal literature of the possibility of carefully
structuring creativity incentives to avoid these detrimental effects.
Moreover, until now, no one has tested the implications of the way that IP
law specifically structures incentives for creative production. This Article
takes a first step in that direction, with regard to the protectability
thresholds in intellectual property and the effect on creativity of varying
them.

137. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29, 43 (2011).
138. Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Propertyand the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
623, 625 (2012).
139. Id.at 675-78.
140. Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and
the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1999, 2008 (2011).
141. Id.at 2012.
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C. Motivationfor This Research
Although the different creativity thresholds established by copyright
and patent laws have received considerable attention, there has been
relatively little discussion of whether the difference affects creators'
behavior.' 42 The creativity research described above provides some reasons
for thinking that it does. One possibility, consistent with the claims of
Parchomovsky and Stein and Miller, is that the higher creativity threshold
in patent law provides a target that encourages creators to strive for creative
solutions in order to meet the goal. Creators will have explicit knowledge
of what is expected of them, and they will work to achieve it, whereas
copyright law's low threshold may provide no strong motivation to be
particularly creative.
Another possibility, in contrast, is suggested by Theresa Amabile's and
Dan Ariely's work and the broader body of work on the negative effect of
many-particularly high-extrinsic rewards on creativity. 143
Perhaps
creators will be inordinately focused on the high target that patent law
establishes, ultimately leading them to choke, while those subjected to
copyright law's low threshold--or no incentive at all-will be able to relax
and create without the additional anxiety of meeting some externally
imposed benchmark.
Relatedly, the high threshold in patent law may distort performance
relative to copyright law. Whereas creators subject to the copyright regime
might adjust their effort smoothly and efficiently once they have exceeded

142. For one such discussion, see Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 51, at 1510-12, 1528.
Another exception is some interesting speculation in Gregory Mandel's work:
Intriguingly, these results indicate that patent law's nonobviousness requirement
may enhance creative efforts, while copyright's originality requirement could detract
from them. In order to acquire a patent, an invention must not merely be novel in
relation to the prior technology, but must measure a nonobvious advance over
existing technology. The nonobviousness requirement thus mandates a certain level
of creative achievement in order to secure a patent, making a patent a reward for a
particularly creative achievement. To the extent that a potential inventor understands
this, the inventor is likely to perceive a patent as a reward only for a creative
accomplishment, and thus the patent system may enhance intrinsic motivation in this
regard.
The creativity requirement for a copyright, on the other hand, is famously low,
requiring only that a work display a minimum amount of creativity. The Supreme
Court has held that the requisite level of creativity "is extremely low; even a slight
amount will suffice." To the extent that potential creators are aware of copyright's
minimalist creativity standard, the copyright reward will be viewed more as simply
providing a reward for task performance. The perception of a task performance
reward produces only extrinsic motivation, rather than providing the desired internal
desire to achieve a creative result, and may lead to a reduction in the creativity of
copyright-related efforts.
Mandel, supra note 140, at 2012-13 (citations omitted) (quoting Feist Publ'ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel.

Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)).
143. See supra section II(A)(2).
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its very low threshold-which might appear to creators as nary a threshold
at all-creators subject to the patent regime may cluster around the
threshold. If creators are intrinsically motivated they may actually perform
better with copyright law's negligible target. However, this effect ought not
occur if there is some additional incentive for ever-better performance once
a threshold is crossed.
These questions have not been directly addressed in the existing
empirical literature, but they are important for the emerging discussion
about how IP law can best encourage creativity. In the experiments
described below, we attempt to understand how different kinds of creativity
thresholds affect creators' behavior. Our goal is to test these issues across a
range of different creativity tasks.
III. Experimental Tests of Creativity Thresholds
The following experiments involve various tasks for subjects to
complete in order to win a $500 prize. The subjects' performance in the
tasks was scored. For each of the experiments, the subjects were randomly
assigned to one of five different threshold conditions that determined how
the prize would be distributed. The experiments all used the same set of
thresholds in order to test whether different kinds of creativity would be
differentially affected by threshold structure. For brevity, we describe the
five threshold conditions just once below.
Our goal in designing the different conditions is to model the creativity
thresholds that are used in IP law. As discussed above, 144 copyright law
applies a negligible threshold requiring that an author produce a minimally
creative work to qualify for protection. Patent law has a much higher
standard, limiting protection to inventions that are both novel and
nonobvious to someone skilled in the relevant art. Our conditions reflect
these differences in the magnitude of the threshold. In addition to testing
the effects of different thresholds on subjects' creativity, we want to
compare that performance to the performance of subjects who receive no
incentive to be creative. This condition provides a baseline from which to
assess the effects of different thresholds on creativity.
Our five conditions are as follows:
" No Incentive - Subjects were told that although their
performance in the task would be scored, their score would
not affect their chances to win the $500 prize. Instead, each
subject would be assigned a lottery ticket, and the winner
would be drawn at random.
" Copyright - Subjects were told that their performance on the
task would be scored, and that for each point they received

144. See supra subpart I(B).
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they would earn one lottery ticket for a random prize
drawing. Accordingly, each subject who submitted a valid
answer had a chance of winning the prize, but subjects who
provided better answers had better chances to win.
"

Patent High - Subjects were told that their performance on

the task would be scored. Next, they were told that the
subjects whose performance was in the top 5% of total
scores would receive one lottery ticket for each point that
they scored and that the lottery tickets would be entered into
a random drawing for the prize. Subjects whose scores were
below the top 5% would not receive lottery tickets.
"

Patent Mid - Subjects were given the same instructions as

for Patent High except the threshold was set at the top 25%.
"

Patent Low - Subjects were given the same instructions as

for Patent High except the threshold was set at the top 50%.
For each of the conditions, the subjects were provided with a
hypothetical example that demonstrated how the lottery tickets would be
distributed.
The provision of prizes in our experiments differs from those of other
creativity and threshold experiments. The prize winner for the four IPrelated conditions is determined by a lottery that relates task performance
above the threshold with probability of winning. This method better
simulates IP law's indirect rewards for creativity via the provision of
exclusive rights that are more likely to prove valuable as the quality of the
underlying creative work increases.1 45 Unlike other creativity experiments
in which a prize is awarded to the entry judged to be the best,1 46 here we
seek to model the probabilistic relationship between IP rights and monetary
returns to the owner. To that end, our experiments employ a lottery or
tournament style prize-distribution mechanism that is consistent with the
way market value tends to be distributed in IP markets. 147 Our model
145. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
146. Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI.
L. REv. 31, 37-39 (2011) [hereinafter Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect]; Christopher
Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2010); Christopher Jon Sprigman, Christopher Buccafusco &
Zachary Bums, What's a Name Worth?: Experimental Tests of the Value of Attribution in
IntellectualProperty,93 B.U. L. REv. 1389, 1405-09 (2013).
147. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REv. 926, 926-27
(2000) (contemplating the patent system as a race to invent between competitors); Jennifer F.
Reinganum, The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development, and Diffusion, in 1 HANDBOOK
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 849, 850-52 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989)
(same). We could run the experiments again using a different model of payouts, such as
proportional payouts to each subject based on their performance.
Cf. John P. Conley &
Christopher S. Yoo, Nonrivalry and Price Discriminationin Copyright Economics, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1801, 1804 (2009) (contemplating that many similar protected creations can coexist and be
"imperfect substitutes" for one another).
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assumes that IP rights play a gatekeeping function that tends to limit
competition in a field only to those works that qualify for rights, and that
within the category of those that qualify, the probability of marketplace
success is directly-but not completely-related to the quality of the
work. 148

Additionally, we maintain the same total prize value in each condition:
the winner of the lottery for each of the five conditions receives $500.
Although this equivalence keeps the conditions symmetrical in terms of the
value-per-subject payouts, it does create different marginal values for better
scores in the Copyright and Patent conditions. In the Copyright condition,
the value of additional creativity is linear and increasing-more and better
answers yield higher chances to win. In the Patent conditions, however, the
value of additional creativity is dichotomous: More and better answers are
worth nothing until the subject reaches the threshold, and after that they are
increasingly valuable. Thus, the marginal value of additional creativity in
the Patent conditions relative to the Copyright condition has a very different
valence depending on the location of a particular subject's solution on the
creativity spectrum: Below the Patent threshold, additional creativity in a
Patent condition is worth less than additional creativity in Copyright, but
above the Patent threshold, additional creativity in a Patent condition is
worth more than additional creativity in the Copyright condition because
fewer subjects will be in the final lottery.
If subjects were able to calculate the expected value of their
participation in such a way that it differed ex ante across conditions, it
would have been necessary to adjust the prize value across the conditions to
ensure that the expected value was the same across the conditions so as not
to confound the threshold condition with the expected value of the prize.
That said, subjects cannot calculate the expected value of their participation
for at least two reasons: They do not know how many other subjects are
participating, nor do they know the distribution of scores that subjects will
have. Because subjects do not know other subjects' scores, there is no way
for subjects to know both how high they will have to score to hit their
condition's threshold and how many lottery tickets there will be in total
(both of which affect their chances of winning the prize). 149 We think that
this indeterminacy models the patent and copyright systems and the
50
subsequent payoffs that rightholders might achieve in the marketplace.,
In other words, the key difference between the Patent and Copyright
conditions is not the total expected payoff, but the way in which the payoff
148. These assumptions involve a number of simplifications of competition in the real world,
but they are required in order to explain the experimental setup to subjects.
149. The best they might do is build a rudimentary qualitative model to approximate whether
they might perform well and meet the threshold, whether due to optimism, confidence, or lack
thereof, issues as to which we enquire in our experiments. See infra subparts III(A)-(D).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 145-148.
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is distributed. The Patent and Copyright conditions subject the same total
expected payoff to different risk profiles. The risk profiles are created by
the differing thresholds.
Finally, the structure of the thresholds in our studies differs from many
of those in the prevailing literature because they are not purely binary.
Although there is a discontinuity between those who reach the threshold
and those who fail to reach the threshold, those who do reach it are not
treated identically. Better performance above the threshold is rewarded
more than weaker performance above the threshold. Accordingly, we
expect not to see a significant diminution in effort by high talent individuals
who can easily clear the threshold, because they stand to gain further
advantage by increased performance.
Experiment I - ComputationalCreativity
In Experiment 1, we seek to measure the effects of different kinds of
creativity thresholds on subjects' responses to a "computational" creativity
task. The task involved mathematical reasoning, but it was difficult enough
(and NP-complete) 15 1 that participants would not be able to compute the
solution in any straightforward or complete way in the time given. Instead,
they would have to rely on some sort of heuristic to approximate the
optimal answer. The task presented an opportunity for creativity in
constructing a heuristic that would yield answers close to the optimum. Our
goal in this task was to model aspects of information aggregation and
convergent152thinking that play significant roles in intellectual discovery and
invention.
To test the effects of thresholds on this sort of creativity, we adapted a
variant of the classic knapsack problem, a combinatorial optimization
problem that derives its name from one of the ways in which it is typically
structured-as a game featuring a player who must fill a knapsack of fixed
weight capacity with items of the maximum value chosen from a menu of
items, each having a specific value and weight. 53 Our version of the

A.

151. NP-complete problems are those for which there is no known efficient (polynomial time)
way to find a solution (although the solution can be verified quickly once it is found). In fact, the
time required to solve the problem increases substantially as the size of the problem grows.
Because of the complexity of NP-complete problems, algorithms that tackle these problems
typically use heuristics or approximation to "solve" them. See generally MICHAEL SIPSER,
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF COMPUTATION 299-310 (3d ed. 2012) (defining NP-

completeness and explaining the complexities in solving such problems).
152. See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 15, at 56-58 (discussing information aggregation
problems in the invention process).
153. See generally HANS KELLERER ET AL., KNAPSACK PROBLEMS 1-9 (2004) (describing
the knapsack problem and its mathematical implications). Other scholars have used knapsack'
problems to study innovation and incentives. See Deborah Meloso et al., PromotingIntellectual
Discovery: Patents Versus Markets, 323 SCIENCE 1335, 1336-37 (2009) (explaining a similar
study that utilized a knapsack problem to test patent innovation).
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problem was based on the popular "Oregon Trail" video game of the
1980s, 154 and featured not a knapsack, but a covered wagon that players
were asked to fill. The wagon had a weight limit, and players were
presented with a menu of items, each having a specific value and weight.
Because one cannot determine whether a given item is in the optimal
solution until one knows the solution, 55 the game requires more than
simple mathematics. Moreover, subjects were limited to 180 seconds to
submit a solution, which meant that at the level of difficulty presented by
the problem, players would almost certainly be unable to compute the
optimal combination of items. They were forced, instead, to rely on some
heuristic to approach the optimum solution within the time allotted. One
such heuristic, for example, would be to estimate the approximate ratios
between value and weight, and attempt to fill the wagon with the items
presenting the highest ratio. 156 Players using this heuristic would approach,
but would only very rarely achieve, the optimum solution.
Subjects were recruited online using Amazon's Mechanical Turk
subject recruitment service. 157 Recruitment was restricted to those in the
United States. Once subjects signed up to take the experiment, they were
directed to the Qualtrics survey website. Subjects were apprised of the
rules of the game and given an opportunity to practice on a simplified
example. After receiving these instructions, subjects were randomly
assigned to one of the five different conditions based on creativity
thresholds described above.
We recruited 1,003 subjects to participate in the experiment. The
sample had a mean age of 31.2 (SD = 10.11) and was 36% female. They
were fairly well educated, 88.3% reporting having at least some college
education. Self-reported math skills were above average; 88.7% of respondents said they were "Okay" at math (the midpoint of the scale) or better.
Subjects were paid $1 to participate and were given a chance to win a
$500 prize. Subjects were excluded from the sample if their Mechanical
Turk worker ID matched one that previously had been used in a pilot
version of this study or if the subject believed that she had participated in
the pilot study. 158 In addition, subjects were excluded from the analysis if
154. See Jessica Lussenhop, Oregon Trail: How Three Minnesotans Forgedits Path, CITY
PAGES, Jan. 19, 2011, http://www.citypages.com/2011-01-19/news/oregon-trail-how-threeminnesotans-forged-its-path/ (detailing the history of the Oregon Trail game and its widespread
popularity).
155. Meloso et al., supra note 153, at 1337.
156. Another plausible heuristic would involve adding the most valuable item currently
available until doing so would result in an overweight wagon and then adding the next most
valuable item until doing so would result in an overweight wagon, and so forth.
157. See generally Winter Mason & Siddharth Suri, Conducting Behavioral Research on
Amazon's Mechanical Turk, 44 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 1 (2012) (explaining the functionality of
Amazon's Mechanical Turk research platform).
158. First, we used an identified method to exclude workers who had previously participated
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their responses to follow-up questions indicated that they had not paid
attention to the experiment. 159 The likelihood of being excluded due to
inattention was not significantly correlated with the different conditions.
This left us with 986 subjects in the sample.

We excluded almost 200 more subjects, as discussed below, for not
complying with the rules governing the task. The remaining sample of 789
had a mean age of 30.9 (SD = 9.79) and was 38% female. They were fairly
well educated, 89% reporting having at least some college education. Selfreported math skills were again above average; 87.8% of respondents said
they were "Okay" at math (the midpoint of the scale) or better. The
participants were distributed across conditions as follows:

Table 1

N (before
exclusions)
No Incentive
Copyright
Patent High
Patent Mid
Patent Low
Total

201
202
204
201
195
1003

Excluded for
Inattention/
Previous
Participation
6
1
5
1
5
18

Excluded for
Overweight

Analyzed
N

88
39
21
21
24
193

107
162
177
177
166
789

We analyzed two separate metrics of subjects' performance on the
wagon task. Our first measure of performance considers the number of
subjects who exceeded the wagon's weight limit. Subjects were told that
they would receive zero points if they exceeded the weight limit, so doing
so constitutes poorer task performance. Participants were significantly

in earlier iterations by identifying their worker ID and disallowing access to those in a previous
sample. See Eyal Peer et al., Selectively Recruiting Participants from Amazon's Mechanical Turk
Using Qualtrics (Nov. 9, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=2100631 (describing a method to use Qual-trics, rather than Mechanical
Turk, to exclude workers who participated in a previous study). We further asked how many of
the 1,003 total participants felt like they had taken the survey before; four responded in the
positive and were excluded.
159. See Adam W. Meade & S. Bartholomew Craig, Identifying CarelessResponses in Survey
Data, 17 PSYCHOL. METHOD 437, 452 (2012) (finding that these self-reports correlate with other
attention filters). Finally, we asked how much attention the participant paid to the survey and "In
your honest opinion, should we use your data in our analyses in this study?" In our remaining
sample, the two questions were correlated at r = .068. Of the remaining sample, 982 responded
that we should use their data, of whom 98.7% reported they gave the study "most of' or "all of'
their attention.
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more likely to go overweight in the No Incentive condition (45.1%) than
160
either the Copyright (19.4%) or the Patent (11.3%) conditions.
Furthermore, those in the Copyright condition were significantly more
likely to go overweight than those in the Patent conditions.' 61 There were
no significant differences between the various Patent thresholds. These
results indicate that subjects in the Patent conditions performed better than
did subjects in the Copyright condition, and that subjects in both the Patent
and Copyright conditions outperformed subjects in the No Incentive
condition. Relative to the Patent conditions, subjects in the No Incentive
and Copyright conditions were likely trying less hard or paying less
attention to the task.
Our second measure of performance compared mean wagon value
across the conditions. Because subjects who went overweight received zero
points, including them in this analysis would bias downward those
conditions with a disproportionate number of overweight wagons.
Accordingly, they were excluded from this analysis. The remaining 789
participants were analyzed for their performance on the task. The best
possible solution for the task is 684 (possible with a few different
combinations of items). The data on subjects' responses appears below.
Table 2
Max
Possible
Value:

Value
(SD)

No
In centiv e

500.79
( 123 .08)

48hp

No
No
Copyright/Patent Incentive/Pooled
Incentive/
Patent
Comparisons
Copyright
Comparison
Comparison
p = .885 , n_
= .885, n.s.

__

Allps: 023
Copyright (113.45)
521.88
Patent
(130.23)
High
p=. 0 6 9
530.06
Patent
p = .069
(123.13)
Mid
540.40
Patent
(125.22)
Low
All p values are SPSS-adjusted Sidakps. Bonferroni corrections did not differ
significantly.
160. All Sidak adjusted ps < .024. An omnibus F-test revealed no differences between
individual patent conditions, except where discussed.
161. Omnibus F(2,979) = 59.40, p < .0001. All post-hoc test ps < .025 using Sidak
corrections.
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Chart 1
Mean Wagon Value (max 684)*

560
540
520

500
480
460
440
420
No Incentive Copyright

Patent High

Patent Mid

Patent Low

Error bars are standard errors.

As outlined in the above table, post-hoc analyses indicate that subjects
in each of the Patent conditions performed significantly better than those in
the Copyright condition. 162 Subjects in the Copyright condition did not
perform significantly differently than those in the No Incentive condition.
There were no statistically significant differences between the Patent
conditions.
Because performance in each of the Patent conditions did not differ
significantly, we also look at comparisons when the Patent conditions are
pooled.1 63 Those in the pooled Patent conditions performed the best
(M- 530.58, SD = 126.79), with No Incentive performing second-best
(500.80) and Copyright performing the worst (480.78).164 Post-hoc tests
with Sidak corrections reveal the Copyright vs. pooled Patent differ
significantly65 (p< .001) and No Incentive vs. Patent differ marginally
(p = .069).
Because the different Patent levels did not affect performance
significantly in any of the studies reported in this Article, we can look at the
difference between subjects' performance in the Copyright condition versus
the Patent Mid condition as a representative comparison. Participants in the

162. Omnibus F(4,786) = 10.9 9 ,p <.0001.
163. There was a slight but non-significant trend that higher thresholds induced worse
performance (Patent High M = 521.88, Patent Mid M = 530.06, Patent Low M = 540.40).
164. Omnibus F(2,786) = 10.99, p < .0001.
165. The corrections used in the analysis are intended to control for the use of multiple
conditions. Because it is more likely that a significant result will appear due to chance when more
conditions are used, these corrections require a higher degree of significance to establish a
meaningful result.
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Patent Mid condition significantly outperformed those in the Copyright
condition (Patent Mid M = 530.06, Copyright M = 480.78, t = 3.821,
p <.001).
In sum, we find evidence that subjects in the Patent conditions
outperform those in the Copyright condition. Those in the No Incentive
condition perform similarly to those in the Copyright condition and worse
than those in the Patent conditions. Interestingly, we find no significant
differences between the various Patent thresholds. It seems that some nonnegligible threshold will motivate increased performance on this nonalgorithmic convergent-thinking task.
We should note that our experimental design tends to understateperhaps significantly-the differences between the No Incentive, Copyright, and Patent conditions. This is because, as we noted above, subjects
were significantly more likely to produce overweight wagons in the No
Incentive condition (45.1%) versus Copyright (19.4%) and (even more
markedly) Patent (11.3%). We did not assign a value to overweight
wagons, instead, we excluded them from our second-stage data analysis
entirely. If we had assigned some value to these overweight wagons
(presumably zero), we would see larger differences between the conditions.
In order to better understand why the higher threshold was producing
better results, we asked several questions when the task was over:
" How likely do you think it is that you will be the winner of
the $500 prize?
" How likely do you think it is that your answer will be in the
top X% and get you into the lottery? (Patent conditions
only)
* How motivated were you to score well on the game?
* How much fun didyou think the game was to play?
Each of these was significantly correlated with performance. 166 We
also asked participants how many other people they believed were in the
competition. One possible response might be to perform better as a
function of there being more people in the competition to overcome, and
yet, on the other hand, subjects might perform worse out of a fear of
futility. 167 Performance on the task was significantly correlated with beliefs
about how many others were also in the task, 68 but these beliefs did not
differ across conditions. 169 Accordingly, it does not appear as though the

166. All rs> .09, allps_.012.
167. See Stephen M. Garcia & Avishalom Tor, The N-Effect: More Competitors, Less
Competition, 20 PSYCHOL. Sci. 871, 871 (2009) (finding that increasing the number of
competitors can decrease competitors' motivation).
168. Spearmanr=.087,p =.015.
169. Kruskal-Wallis H =5.213,4 d.f.,p = .266.
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results are driven by differing assumptions about the size of the competitive
pool.
We also measured competitiveness as a possible mediator for the
differences in performance between conditions. We hypothesized that the
Patent conditions might be promoting people to be more competitive
because there were fewer slots available in the lottery, and thus more
likelihood to win if a subject were to make it into the lottery pool.
Competitiveness was assessed with four items, adapted from previous
research on the issue. 1 70 Our competitiveness measure failed to pick up any
significant differences between subjects in the different conditions. 7 '
Though it is possible to have mediation without association between the
and
variables,' 72 the difference in performance between the Patent Mid 73
Copyright conditions was not a result of differences in competitiveness.1
The most obvious explanation for the increased performance in the
Patent conditions is that subjects perceive improvement in an answer to
have a higher value than they do in the other conditions. While this is true
once subjects exceed the threshold, it is not necessarily true as a general
matter. That is, if a subject exceeds the threshold in the Patent conditions,
each increment of improvement in an answer is worth more than the same
improvement would be worth in Copyright. But improvements in answers
below the Patent threshold are worth less than those in Copyright. It is
74
possible that the subjects in the Patent conditions assumed, optimistically,
170. See John Houston et al., Revising the Competitiveness Index Using FactorAnalysis, 90
PSYCHOL. REPORTS 31, 33 tbl. 1 (2002). The four items were selected from the "Enjoyment of
Competition" subscale, as the other subscale, "Contentiousness" does not apply to competitiveness in the current context. The selected items were "Iam a competitive individual," "I try
to avoid competing with others," "I find competitive situations unpleasant," and "I enjoy
competing against an opponent." All responses were on a five-point Likert scale, with points
labeled "Strongly Disagree," "Disagree," "Neither Agree nor Disagree," "Agree," and "Strongly
Agree." The middle two items were reverse coded.
Among all participants not excluded for being overweight or other reason discussed above, the
four items were highly correlated (Chronbach's a = .919; all bivariate rs > .676, all ps < .0001),
and so the items were averaged into a composite competitiveness measure. The overall mean
competitiveness in the sample was 3.57, or just above the midpoint of the scale, indicating a slight
taste for competition.
171. An omnibus F-test indicated competitiveness did not differ by condition (F(2,786) =
1.26, n.s.). This is not to say that competitiveness was not a useful measure. The index was
correlated with performance at r =. 108 (p = .002). Furthermore, the index correlated positively
with other measures, such as likelihood of winning, likelihood of getting into the lottery, selfreported motivation, and self-reported fun with the task (all rs < .14, all ps < .001). However, the
different conditions do not induce the differences in performance via competitiveness.
172. Andrew F. Hayes, Beyond Baron and Kenny: Statistical Mediation Analysis in the New
Millennium, 76 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 408, 413 (2009).
173. Using a bootstrap model to estimate the indirect effect, the 95% confidence interval
= .077, 95% Cl: [-3.471, 4.015]), indicating that competitiveness did not mediate
included 0 (fl
the effect of condition on performance.
174. Optimism among creators is consistent with previous research. See Buccafusco &
Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 146, at 31 (explaining that "creators of works value their
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that they would clear the threshold and were competing in the part of
the
175
distribution where improvements in answers were especially valuable.
Our results from Experiment 1 are illuminating and suggestive. In
general, the existence of some threshold for entry into a prize lottery had a
positive effect on subjects' performance.
Subjects in the Copyright
condition produced solutions that failed to satisfy the rules of the task
significantly more often than did those in the Patent conditions. Moreover,
when we compare only those solutions that met the rules of the task,
Copyright subjects still performed significantly worse. These results
suggest that the negligible threshold in the Copyright condition caused
subjects to be less motivated or to pay less attention to the task than did the
higher thresholds in the Patent conditions. Interestingly, however, we
detected no significant difference in performance among the various Patent
conditions.
Experiment 2 - Verbal Creativity
In Experiment 1, we sought to measure the effects of different levels of
creativity thresholds on subjects' responses to a computational convergent
thinking creativity task. As addressed in Part II, however, notions of
creativity vary widely in different situations. Accordingly, we wanted to
test whether our results with a computational creativity task would hold for
a task that involved a different kind of creative behavior. The following
experiment tested the effects of different thresholds on a verbal divergentthinking creativity task.
In order to test the effects of thresholds on verbal creativity, we
adapted a creativity game that has long been used by the Odyssey of the
Mind organization. 176 The task involved rapidly generating a list of words
that bear an indirect relationship with some target word, usually in the form
of a pun. In our task, subjects were asked to come up with a list of "keys,"
and they were rewarded for answers that were judged to be creative. For
example, "house key" would not be considered a creative answer, while
"Keyshawn Johnson," "monkey," "keynote speech," or "John Maynard
Keynes" would be considered creative. The ability to generate unexpected
or punning uses of a word is a significant feature of verbal or linguistic
creativity.' 77 Also, unlike the Wagon task in Experiment 1, this task
B.

creations substantially more than do both potential purchasers of their works and mere owners of

the works").
175. Even though we did not detect any differences in self-reported motivation between the
conditions, subjects might nonetheless have experienced different levels of motivation that they
did not or could not accurately report.
176. See Learn More!, ODYSSEY MIND, http://www.odysseyofthemind.com (describ-ing
various problem designs used to teach "creative problem-solving methods").
177. See, e.g., JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES (First Vintage Int'l ed. 1990) (exemplifying significant
literary usage of puns).
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involves divergent thinking. Rather than offering a single right answer,
divergent thinking tasks are open-ended
and enable subjects to generate a
178
multitude of novel relationships.
Again using computers connected to the Qualtrics survey website,
subjects were told that they would be playing a game that involved verbal
creativity. As with Experiment 1, subjects were paid $1 for participating in
the task, and they were told that they would have a chance to win a $500
prize. Subjects were told that they would be asked to list words or phrases
that fit a given theme, that they would receive one point for creative
answers, and that they would receive zero points for standard answers.
Subjects were told that examples of creative and standard answers would be
given to them.
After they acknowledged that they understood the directions, all of the
subjects were directed to the creativity task. Subjects were given the
following instructions:
In three minutes, provide as many examples of "keys" as you can.
CreativeAnswer: "monkey " = I point
StandardAnswer: "house key" = 0 points

Subjects typed their answers into the survey program. Following the
task, subjects were asked to complete a series of demographic and followup questions.
We recruited 1,005 participants through Amazon's Mechanical Turk
service. As before, recruitment was restricted to those in the United States.
Subjects were told that they would receive $1 for performing a creativity
task and that they would be eligible to win a $500 prize. As with
Experiment 1, workers who had taken other studies in this Article were
disallowed from participating. Of those remaining, 55 reported we should
not use their data. Finally, we used JavaScript to limit some of the
behaviors available to participants. For example, we did not want
participants to open a new browser window and search terms that include
"key," so once the round began, the study automatically advanced if the
participant clicked off of the task window. Subjects were told about this
rule and instructed not to click off the task window. We excluded 155
participants for violating this rule. The number of excluded participants did
not differ by condition.

178. See supra text accompanying notes 74-78; see also Runco & Okuda, supra note 77, at
217 (finding that divergent thinking incorporates both problem solving and problem discovery).
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The remaining participants were distributed as follows:
Table 3

N (before
exclusions)

Excluded for
Inattention/
Previous
Participation

Excluded for
C k
Clicakng o

Analyzed
N

No
Ne
Incentive

198

11

27

160

Copyright
Patent High
Patent Mid
Patent Low
Total

201
203
201
202
1005

10
14
10
10
55

33
26
41
28
155

158
163
150
164
795

In order to assess the creativity of responses, the subjects' responses
were standardized and then rated. First, every entry was standardized by
two independent raters and ties were broken by a third, so that spelling,
plurals, and word forms were consistent. This standardization produced
737 unique answers. Next, we created a task (excluding workers who
generated the answers) on Amazon's Mechanical Turk service advertised as
a "Rating Task." 179 Workers were first exposed to the prompt given to the
participants who generated the answers, and then they were given two
examples of both creative and standard answers. Each worker then
evaluated 40 of the unique entries, using their own intuitions to produce the
ratings,' 80 responding "Creative," "Standard," or "I'm not familiar with
this." Raters did not generally use "I'm not familiar with this," the largest
percentage being 29.7% for "paracentric key." Any answer receiving more
than 50% of total votes as "Creative" was tallied as creative. Each answer
was rated between 24 and 56 times, with the average number of times being
48.2.181 The raters were reasonably consistent with each other. Of the
answers, 79.5% had vote ratios of at least 2:1 in the direction of the final
rating (for example, "whiskey" received 44 creative votes, 5 standard votes,
and 0 "I'm not familiar with this" votes and was thus rated as creative). Of
answers in the middle tercile of vote ratios (those with vote ratios of less
than 2:1), 47.1% were voted creative, indicating no bias towards standard or

179. Workers were paid $0.50 for the task.
180. The rating system used here is similar to those employed in the Consensual Assessment
Technique. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
181. Standard deviation is 6.19.
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creative on answers about which the raters were in relatively less
agreement.
The mean results are displayed below.
Table 4
Total Answers Creative Answers Standard Answers
No Incentive
Copyright
Patent High
Patent Mid
Patent Low
All Patents
Pooled

9.36
8.54
9.14
9.10
9.01
9.08

5.12
5.32
6.43
6.51
5.84
6.25

4.24
3.22
2.71
2.59
3.18
2.83

III_

I

In general, subjects in the various Patent conditions provided more
creative answers than did subjects in the Copyright condition. The data are
fairly consistent with the previous studies reported, as well as an unreported
pilot study: Copyright and No Incentive are similar, and induce worse
performance than the Patent conditions (which all perform similarly).
Table 5
Answers

No
Incentive

5.12 (4.42)

Copyright

5.32 (3.79)

Patent
High

6.43 (6.08)

Patent Mid

6.51 (5.99)

Patent Low

5.84 (5.19)

NoCopyright
Incentive/
Comparison
p

Copyright/
Patent
Comparisons

No Incentive/
Pooled
Patent
Comparison

, n.s.
All ps n.s.

p =.051

Allp values are SPSS-adjusted Sidakps. Bonferroni corrections did not
differ significantly.

Texas Law Review

1960

[Vol. 92:1921

Chart 2
Mean Creative Answers*

8,

5
4
3

2
14

0

No Incentive

Copyright

Patent High

Patent Mid

Patent Low

Error bars are standard errors

When we compare all of the conditions using full corrections for
significance, post-hoc analyses do not indicate differences in performance
at standard statistical levels.'8 2 Subjects in the Copyright condition did not
perform significantly differently than those in the No Incentive condition.
Because performance in each of the Patent conditions did not differ
significantly, we also look at comparisons when the Patent conditions are
pooled. Those in the pooled Patent conditions performed the best (M =
6.25, SD = 5.76), with Copyright performing second-best (5.32) and No
Incentive performing the worst (5.12).183 Post-hoc tests with Sidak
corrections reveal the No Incentive vs. pooled Patent differed marginally
(p = .051) and Copyright vs. pooled Patent differed somewhat (p = .147).
Copyright and No Incentive did not differ.
If we look at the representative comparison between the Copyright and
Patent Mid conditions, those in the Patent Mid condition produced no more
total answers than those in the Copyright condition (difference = .56,
t = .993, p - .32 1). They did, however, produce a significantly greater
number of creative answers (difference = 1.19, t = 2.04, p = .042). These

results suggest that the establishment of some creative threshold positively
affects subjects' performance on a verbal creativity task. When creative
answers are incentivized by a threshold that conditions a prize on achieving
the threshold, subjects tend to provide more of them.
Responses to the demographic questions revealed no significant
differences based on reported age or gender. Both education level and self-

182. Omnibus F(4,795) = 2.32,p = .056.
183. Omnibus F(2,795) = 3.83,p =.022.
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reported verbal ability were significantly correlated with creative answer
generation on the task but were equally represented across conditions.
We again assessed competitiveness using the same items as in
Experiment 1 on computational creativity. Competitiveness was correlated
with the production of creative answers (r = .073, p = .039). However,
there were no differences in competitiveness across conditions.
We asked participants their perceived likelihood of winning on a sixpoint Likert scale.' 84 Participants were generally pessimistic about their
chances,' 85 although perceived likelihood of winning was correlated with
generation of creative answers (r = .251,p < .0001). We also asked those in
the Patent conditions how likely they thought they would be to exceed the
threshold and get into the lottery. Participants in the Patent conditions were
slightly more optimistic about clearing the threshold than winning, 186 and
this was again correlated with how many creative answers participants
generated (r = .364 , p < .0001).
These variables could help us assess the psychological mechanism that
is responsible for the performance differences between conditions. For
example, do any of the conditions induce differential beliefs about the
likelihood of winning, which in turn produces better performance? In order
to assess this, we constructed several mediation models. 87 We used the
bootstrap model of Preacher and Hayes 188 to estimate (separately) the
indirect effect of both likelihood of winning and probability of surpassing
the threshold on production of creative answers based on 10,000 bootstrap
samples. According to the simulations, the indirect effects of likelihood of
winning and probability of surpassing the threshold between any of the
conditions failed to reach significance. That is, according to the mediation
models, the differences in production of creative answers described above
do not operate through the mediating influence of either perceived
likelihood of winning or perceived likelihood of surpassing the threshold.
If anything, the process is working in the other direction. For example, the
184. The categories were Very Unlikely, Unlikely, Somewhat Unlikely, Somewhat Likely,
Likely, and Very Likely.
185. The mean response was 2.10 (Unlikely); 86.2% responded Somewhat Unlikely or below.
186. The mean response was 2.61 (between Unlikely and Somewhat Unlikely).
187. Mediation is a statistical tool used to identify a third variable that explains the
relationship between the independent and dependent variables. In our experiment, we tested to
see whether differences in performance by condition could be explained by a more complex
process: specifically, that the conditioning induced different expectations of winning, which in
turn induced differential performance.
188. Kristopher J. Preacher & Andrew F. Hayes, SPSS and SAS Proceduresfor Estimating
Indirect Effects in Simple Mediation Models, 36 BEHAV. RES. METHODS INSTRUMENTS &
COMPUTERS 717, 721-22 (2004). This method is preferred to the traditional one proposed by
Reuben M. Baron & David A. Kenny, The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social
Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations, 51 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1173, 1174-81 (1986), as it does not rely on the assumption that
the sampling distribution of the mediation effect is normal.
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differences in assessment of win likelihood between the Copyright and
Patent Mid conditions are mediated by differences in performance on the
task. 89 That is, the difference in performance drives expectations of
winning, not vice versa.
In general, our test of the effects of thresholds on verbal divergent
creativity aligns with the results of our test of computational convergent
creativity in Experiment 1. In both experiments, the existence of some
threshold for entry into a prize lottery produced more creative answers
when compared to a condition where subjects would always be entered into
the lottery. Our attempts to determine the psychological mechanism
responsible for this improvement are, however, inconclusive at this stage.
Our data suggests that a high threshold may have a stronger impact on
verbal creativity than a lower threshold, but more work is needed to test
whether and why this is the case. It seems that the existence of some
threshold rather than no threshold generates more verbal creativity.
Experiment 3 - FiguralCreativity
In Experiment 3, we continued to test the effects of creativity
thresholds on divergent thinking, although this time the task involved visual
or figural creativity rather than verbal creativity. Here, we adapted a series
of stimuli that have been repeatedly used in creativity research.' 90 Subjects
were shown a simple black and white figure (see Figure 1), and they were
given three minutes to name as many things as it could be. This task was
then repeated with two additional stimuli. Subjects were told that they
would play three separate creativity games in which they would be shown
pictures and asked to describe as many things as the pictures could be.
Subjects were told that the creativity of their answers would be judged and
that they would receive a cumulative score between 0-100 based on their
overall creativity.
C.

189. fi = .10895% CI: [.0099, .2328].
190. See, e.g., Mark A. Runco, Flexibility and Originality in Children'sDivergent Thinking,
120 J. PSYCHOL. 345, 346-47, 351 (1986) (using "open-ended problems" involving "ambiguous
figural stimuli" to test the creative flexibility of children).
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Figure 1: Sample Stimulus from Experiment 3

Divergent-thinking tasks such as this one are intended to measure a
variety of aspects of creative behavior, including subjects' ability to
generate many original or creative solutions to an open-ended prompt. The
skills associated with divergent thinking about images, however, might be
different from those associated with thinking about words. Since IP law
covers manifold kinds of creative output, we incorporated a task that
matched other key areas of creativity. A figural task like this aligns with
the kinds of tasks that are specifically important to many fields governed by
IP regimes, including product design; mechanical engineering; and the
creation of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.
As with the previous experiments, subjects were recruited via
Amazon's Mechanical Turk and directed to Qualtrics to complete the study.
Again, recruitment was restricted to those in the United States. In total,
1,007 subjects completed the study. Subjects were placed into the same
five threshold conditions discussed above.
Participants were shown three different figures sequentially and asked
to generate as many ideas in 180 seconds about what each figure could be.
Creativity Testing Services (CTS) scored the task according to traditional
indices of fluency (overall count of responses provided),' 9' originality
92
(answers not commonly provided by other participants in the sample),
1 93
fit).
responses
that
categories
and flexibility (number of different lexical
191. Fluency was measured as follows: Subjects' answers that were abbreviated or incoherent
(after a spell-check procedure was done) were removed from their fluency count. After applying
that filter, fluency was measured based on the sum of responses given.
192. Once responses were corrected for typos and spelling errors, each response was
standardized to remove subtle redundancies. For example, "a coin" was standardized to "coin."
The standardized answers, together with how frequently each was given, provided a count of the
most commonly given responses, which in turn, determined originality scoring. The originality
scoring procedure was that the top 10% of most commonly given responses were assigned to a
category of "unoriginal," and all responses not so deemed to be "unoriginal" were given a point
for originality. Each subject then received an originality score, as per CTS procedure, by
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Forty-six participants were removed from analysis at their own
suggestion. The mean results based on the ratings of
the answers given by
94
the remaining 961 participants are displayed below. 1
Table 6
Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Analyzed N
Total Unique Standardized
Responses
Total Lexical Categories

960
1553

944
1872

944
1387

10

8

7

Fluency Mean

7.459

6.831

7.041

Originality Mean

2.275

2.151

2.244

Flexibility Mean

4.303

3.756

3.581

By measuring the number of creative answers per second, we can
95
normalize the creative output with respect to time spent on the task.
Time spent on the task highly correlated with the total creative answers
produced in a given task (all rs > .439), but time spent on the task did not
differ across conditions.

summing the originality points of that subject's answers.
193. The standardized responses used for originality scoring, see supra note 192, were also
used to assign them to lexical categories established by prior samples that used the same figural
tasks. These lexical categories provide general themes of subject responses and were developed to
capture all possible responses provided by participants. The variety of categories in which a
subject's answers fall provides insight on the subject's cognitive shifts throughout her ideational
process. Once responses have been assigned categorical attributes, the numbers of unique
categories are then summed for each subject, resulting in a flexibility score for each subject.
194. Note that not all participants completed all three figure tasks.
195. It might be the case that two participants who have the same productivity might have
different costs of time, meaning that some do not persist, even though they would do equally well.
We test for this by standardizing over time.
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Table 7
Analyzed
N

Average
Fluency

Average
Originality

Average
Flexibility

Average
riginality
per Minute

No
Nc
Incentive

193

7.10

2.14

3.97

1.06

Copyright

195

7.54

2.43

4.02

1.16

Patent
High
Patent
Mid
Patent

191

7.55

2.32

4.07

1.07

193

6.89

2.11

3.78

1.07

189

7.62

2.51

4.03

1.26

573

7.34

2.30

3.97

1.13

Low

All
Patents
Pooled

Averages are across all 3 tasks.
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196
Planned contrasts revealed the following results:

Table 8

Creative
Answers

No Incentive/
Copyright
Comparison

Copyright/
Patent
Comparisons

No

2.14(1.97)

Copyright
Patent
High
High
Patent
Mid
Patent
Low
All Rules
Pooled

2.43 (2.18)
2.32(2.30)

2.30 (2.20)

No Incentive vs. All Rules Pooled
t (956) = 1.14 ,p = .253 n.s.

Pooled
Patent

2.32 (2.28)

Copyright vs. Pooled Patent
t (956) = .623, p = .533 n.s.

2.32_(2.30)

No
Incentive/
Pooled
Patent
Comparison

t (956) = 1.29
pc=v.198, n.s.
All ts < 1.42
All ps n.s.
1(956) = .951
p = .342, n.s.

2.11 (2.22)
2.51 (2.30)

Patents vs. Each Other

All ts < 1.77, All ps n.s.

There were no differences at all across any of the conditions, on any of
the measures. 19 7 Several factors did correlate with production of creative
answers, including time spent on the task (as noted above), how much fun
participants thought the task was (r = .169), self-reported motivation (r =
.126), how well they understood the task (r = 116), self-reported education
(r = .119), and self-reported special ability (r = .064). None of these factors
differed across condition, except motivation, which was higher in both the
Copyright (8.03) and Patent Mid (8.07) conditions as compared to the No
Incentive condition (7.45).'98
A bootstrapped mediation analysis indicates that, as expected, any
lower output in creative answer production by those in the No Incentive
condition (compared to those in Copyright or any Patent condition) can be

196. The results do not differ if we look at the "creative answers per minute" metric.
197. Although these results are not stated as a total creativity score of between 0 and 100, as
subjects were instructed, the fluency, originality, and flexibility scores given to each subject could
readily be normalized to a 100-point scale. The normalization does not affect the analysis herein.
198. Scale from 0-10; Sidak adjustedps = .048 and .026, respectively.
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explained at least in part through lower reported motivation (95% CI:
[.0091, .1159], based on 10,000 resamples). We also found that reported
enjoyment of the task was highly correlated with motivation as discussed
above. Those two factors (No Incentive vs. Any Rule condition and task
enjoyment) alone accounted for nearly 20% of the variance in motivation
across all participants (R2 = .19).
We find that motivation has an impact on the generation of creative
answers through persistence: Those who report higher motivation tend to
spend longer on the tasks, and as a result generate a greater number of
creative answers (95% CI: [.0784, .1556], based on 10,000 resamples).
Note that this mediation is not significant for the "creative answers per
minute" metric. That is, motivated participants are not producing answers
any faster, but they simply persist longer and hence generate a higher
volume of answers. If this is the case, our short time window (180 seconds
per task) could explain our failure to detect significant differences between
the conditions. Had we used a longer time window, variations in
motivation between the conditions may have resulted in measurable
differences in creative output. 199
In addition, although the threshold conditions did not produce any
changes in creative output, we have some clues about the differences
between internal motivation (such as how much one enjoys a task) and
external motivation (such as how much the particular incentive condition
affects output). This in turn might begin to explain some of the nuances of
how and when these rules are likely to affect creative output. Future
research should explore how these factors interact in a complex
environment.
D. Experiment 4 - Non-Creative Task
Our findings from two of our previous three experiments suggest that
subjects perform better on a variety of creative tasks when their chance to
win a monetary prize is determined by a high threshold of achievement.
What is unclear, however, is whether this effect is specifically related to
performance on creativity tasks or whether it exists for other kinds of tasks
as well.
To begin to answer this question, we performed an additional
experiment using a simple addition task. Subjects were presented with ten
numbers in a matrix and asked to find the two that summed to a target
number. Like the creativity task, this task required our subjects to engage
in cognitive effort, but unlike those tasks, this task did not involve

199. In Experiments 1 and 2, we detected some significant differences between conditions
even using short time periods similar to those used in Experiment 3. It is possible, however, that
variations in performance simply show up earlier with certain kinds of creativity than they do with

others.
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creativity. Our goal with this experiment was to isolate the role of
creativity in our results. In the previous experiments, it was possible that
the high threshold was simply motivating greater cognitive effort rather
than motivating greater creativity. Here, we test whether the different
thresholds produce different results when only cognitive effort is at stake.
Subjects were initially told that they would be playing a game in which
they needed to find two numbers that added up to a target number.20 0
Subjects were shown successively a series of matrices, each of which
included ten two-digit numbers and was paired with a "target" number that
was the sum of only two of the numbers in the matrix. Before seeing this
series of matrices, subjects were given a practice round with one matrix and
associated target number to make sure that they understood the game.
Subjects were then told that they would receive one point for each matrix
they solved correctly (by selecting the two numbers that summed up to the
associated target number) in a total of 90 seconds. They then completed the
task.
As with the creative tasks in Experiments 1-3, the subjects were
randomly assigned to one of the five threshold conditions. There were 30
possible matrices to solve, but the maximum number attempted in 90
seconds was 16. Although we did not make any attempt to stop participants
from using alternate means to solve the problems, the time constraint and
number of possible combinations makes it more costly to cheat than to
simply solve the problem by inspecting and summing.
Of the 1,007 participants in the sample, 32 had technical errors with
the task and were not timed. These subjects are excluded from the main
analyses (but are nonetheless utilized to provide some baseline information
about task difficulty, as outlined below). Four additional participants are
excluded for a different error which makes it unclear how much of the task
they were able to complete before being moved on to the demographic
questions. Of the remaining 971 participants, 27 said that we should not
use their data (as described with regard to the previous experiments above).
The analyses that follow are of the remaining 944 participants (except
where noted).

200. A similar task design has been used by other researchers as well. See Ariely et al., supra
note 94, at 460-61.
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Across the conditions, participants answered an average of 4.24 of the
problems (SD = 2.19) in the allotted 90 seconds. Below are the results of
the first five problems (time expired during the 6th round or earlier for
74.9% of the participants):
Table
Round 1 Round 2
Average Time
to Solve
Percent Correct
Solutions
N
Percent Correct
(no time
constraint)

9201

Round 3

Round 4

Round 5

26.40
(18.83)
85%

19.90
(12.79)
94%

9.65
(7.40)
98%

12.50
(7.51)
97%

17.81
(8.52)
91%

905

797

732

606

384

72%

87%

97%

94%

84%

There were no significant differences across conditions in task
performance. This is true for total number correct, 2 2 total number
attempted,20 3 and percent correct of those attempted.20 4 If we look again at
our representative comparison between Copyright and Patent Mid, they are
not statistically different on any of the measures (all ts < .626, n.s.). Below
are the results from a one-way ANOVA of several key contrasts.

201. All means exclude participants whose 90 seconds expired during the round. The "no
time constraint" averages are for the above described participants whose timers did not work.
202. F(4,939) =.943, n.s. All Sidak adjusted ps> .572.
203. F(4,939) = 1.078, n.s. All Sidak adjusted ps > .556.
204. F(4,939) .116, n.s. All Sidak adjustedps = 1.
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Table 10

Puzzles
Solved
Correctly
No
Incentive
Copyright
Patent
Paen

Copyright/
Patent
Comparisons

No
Incentive/
Pooled
Patent
Comparison

4.16 (2.23)
t (939) = 1.48
3.81

p

140,

(2hh.23)
3.84 (2.00)

High______
Patent
Mid
Patent
Low
All Rules
Pool

No Incentive/
Copyright
Comparison

All ts 5 .589
All ps > .556,
n.s.

_______

______

_

375(230)t

(939) = 1.64
p = .101, n.s.

3.95 (2.44)

Pooled
3.85(2.26)
Patent
Patents vs. Each Other

No Incentive vs. All Rules Pooled
t (939) = 1.74 ,p = .082 n.s.
Copyright vs. Pooled Patent
t (939) =.181,p = .857 n.s.
All ts _ .856, Allps> .392, n.s.

We asked many of the same demographic questions of the participants,
including age, gender, motivation on the task, how fun they thought the task
was, how competitive they were, how educated they were, and how good
they were at math. Age was uncorrelated with performance. Men tended to
get more correct answers than women (Male M = 4.24, Female M = 3.24,
t = 5.79, p < .001), but gender was distributed evenly across conditions.
Unsurprisingly, self-reported education, math ability, and task enjoyment
were significantly correlated with performance (all rs > .089, all ps < .006).
Competitiveness also predicted performance, such that those who scored
1 point higher on the competitiveness scale produced on average 0.31 more
correct answers. All of the above factors, however, were evenly distributed
across conditions. Finally, participants who scored better believed they
were both more likely to get into and win the lottery (both rs >.176, both
ps<.0001).
Two interesting factors that were correlated with performance were
estimations of how many others were in the game in total, and estimations
of how many others were in the lottery (Patent conditions only).,0 5

205. Both Spearman rs> .162, bothps < .0001.
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Estimations of how many others were in the game in total were evenly
distributed across conditions.20 6 For the Patent conditions, estimates of how
many people would make the lottery did increase with the threshold (as in
previous studies), but a mediation analysis indicated that this estimate did
not mediate the relationship between condition and performance. 0 7
These results suggest that the different threshold conditions employed
in this study do not significantly affect subjects' effort on simple cognition
tasks.20 8 Thus, the differences between conditions that we observe in the
earlier experiments are more likely based on a relationship between
threshold level and creative performance.
E.

Summary of Results

Prior research on creativity incentives suggests that in certain
circumstances the provision of rewards for creative performance
undermines creativity. 20 9 That research indicates that monetary incentives
could negatively affect creativity by either crowding out people's intrinsic
motivation or causing them to choke. 210 The work by Amabile, Ariely, and
others, although not directly addressed to the issue of creativity thresholds,
211
seemed to suggest that high thresholds might similarly affect creativity.
One implication of their research was that the high creativity threshold
associated with patent law would produce poorer creative performance than
copyright law's low threshold. Our results are not consistent with that
prediction, and they suggest that, in fact, the opposite might be true.
In none of our experiments did subjects in the Patent conditions
perform significantly worse than those in the Copyright or No Incentive
conditions. This is true even in our final experiment involving non-creative
cognition. Although it is difficult to tell why, the high threshold in the
Patent conditions did not adversely affect subjects' performance by
crowding out subjects' intrinsic motivations or causing them to choke.
Moreover, our research suggests that the opposite may be true of high
thresholds-the existence of some non-trivial creativity threshold seems to
have produced better results. In Experiment 1 (computational creativity),

206. Kruskal-Wallis H(4) = 7.943, p = .094. A nonparametric test was used because the
estimates for this question were unbounded and ranged from 0 to 2,000,000.
207. fl = -. 0006, 95% CI: [-,0078, .0300]. A CI that includes zero indicates a nonsignificant
indirect effect, based on 10,000 bootstrapped resamples, as described in Preacher & Hayes, supra
note 188. Though there was no effect of condition on performance, it is still possible for
mediation to be detected. See Hayes, supra note 172.
208. An unreported pilot study yielded similar results. That study involved a memory task
that asked subjects to name as many U.S. Presidents as they could in ninety seconds. There were
similarly no statistical differences between the conditions.
209. See supra section II(A)(2).
210. See supra section I(A)(2).
211. See supra section I1(A)(2).

1972

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 92:1921

Patent subjects consistently outperformed those in the Copyright and No
Incentive conditions. And the results from Experiment 2 (verbal creativity)
are generally similar. The overall direction of the data is consistent, with
better performance in Patent conditions, and the comparison between
performance in the Copyright and Patent Mid conditions found that the high
threshold produced significantly more creative answers. These findings are
in accord with the research on goal setting discussed above.2 12 The results
from Experiment 3 (figural creativity) suggest that part of what creativity
thresholds might affect is motivation, which engenders greater persistence,
and hence greater output. The impression from Experiment 4 (non-creative
task) is dissimilar; we saw no difference in performance when the task did
not call for creativity.
Interestingly, none of our experiments indicates any significant
differences between the various Patent condition thresholds. We considered
that if a choking effect were to emerge, perhaps it would do so as the
threshold increased. We see no evidence of this in our data. Perhaps such
an effect would have emerged if the threshold became yet more difficult to
achieve (for example, a threshold cutting off all but the top 1%). Whatever
effect the higher threshold seems to be having, it appears to be doing its
work only by imposing a non-negligible threshold in the first place.
Finally, we should note that although we do not find as strong a
difference between the Copyright and Patent conditions in Experiment 2 as
in Experiment 1, that does not mean that such a difference does not exist for
verbal creativity. Unlike the data for Experiment 1, in which the creativity
scores were measured objectively, in Experiment 2 the data are measured
subjectively, producing more noise. It is possible that whatever effect the
threshold may have been having in Experiment 2 was simply drowned by
the noisiness of the subjectively scored data.
Experiment 3 failed to yield significant differences between the
threshold conditions, and this too may have been a difficulty with our study
design. Although the scoring metrics that we used for Experiment 3 were
objective measures of creativity, they may not have fully captured the
variability in and complexity of creativity involved in the figural creativity
task. In addition, the relationship between motivation, task persistence, and
creativity suggests that the short time period of our study may have blunted
differences that would have appeared with a longer duration.
IV. Implications for IP Law
The experiments reported in this Article shed interesting new light on
the effects of incentives on creativity and the role of thresholds in IP law.
Before we spell out the implications of this research, it is important that we

212. See supranotes 127-28.
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discuss the limitations of our experiments and the generalizability of our
findings.
A.

Addressing the Limitations of This Research

In these experiments, higher creativity thresholds appear to produce no
worse creativity and may, in fact, produce more and better creativity than
do low thresholds. The main drawback of this kind of research, however, is
that it requires considerable abstraction from "real world" contexts in order
to produce an experimental setting that is not so complex as to be
unadministrable. The legitimacy and extent of these abstractions affect an
experiment's ecological validity (how well it tracks what happens in the
real world). Here, we address four concerns about the ecological validity of
our research.
First, the subjects in our experiments were all laypeople recruited from
Amazon's Mechanical Turk and not professional or amateur creators. This
difference could matter for a number of reasons. For example, our subjects
and "real" creators might differ in the degree to which they are internally
motivated to complete the creativity tasks. As explained in Part II, research
suggests that internally motivated people may respond differently to
incentives than externally motivated people. Perhaps, for example, we did
not find a "crowding out" effect because our subjects had little to no
intrinsic motivation to crowd out and the high threshold simply motivated
them to work harder than the low threshold did.2" 3
Obviously, whether this is true is subject to empirical validation. We
plan to run similar experiments in the future using subjects who could be
thought of as specialists in these fields.214 That said, with the removal of
formalities in copyright law 21 5 and the rapid growth of user-generated

213. Or conversely, perhaps Amazon's Mechanical Turk subjects are very likely to be
externally motivated, given that they opt to use this service to earn money for tasks. Our
experiments suggest that this may be true in the sense that they are very sensitive to small
differences in payouts. When we first ran our pilot experiments, we offered subjects no money to
participate, but only a chance to win a $500 prize. It took a long time to get subjects to
participate, but once we did, we recorded results in a version of the Experiment I task that were
virtually identical to those reported here. We then re-ran the pilot experiments offering subjects
$1 to participate and a chance to win a $500 prize. Very quickly, we had enough subjects,
finished data collection, and recorded results virtually identical to those reported here. At the
same time, in another experiment implementing the computational-creativity task, we asked
subjects whether they would prefer to be in the Copyright condition or a Patent condition. Of 186
usable participants, 86% preferred the Copyright condition (N = 160) and 14% preferred a Patent

condition (N = 26). There were no statistically significant differences between those who chose
the Copyright condition and those who chose a Patent condition.
214. For example, we might test computer programmers in the computational-creativity task,
creative-writing students in the verbal-creativity task, and designers or engineers in the visualcreativity task.
215. See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REv. 485, 487-88
(2004) (characterizing the Copyright Act of 1976, Berne Convention Implementation Act, the
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content, 216 copyright law increasingly confronts nonprofessional creators.
Much of copyrightable production now comes from nonprofessionals, 21 7 to
whom our findings may be especially applicable.
Related to this concern is a second issue about real-world creativity
contexts. Much creative production occurs within the contexts of firms or
other organizations.218 Scientists may work for companies or universities,
and computer programmers, writers, and musicians may all be employed by
or working for others. In these situations, creators' incentives may not be
structured by the IP regime but rather by internal mechanisms such as
payment, rewards, or tenure. 21 9 Although in some of these situations
producing a protectable creation may be important for innovators' careers
and compensation,22 ° the IP system and its thresholds may not be especially
salient.2 2'
Our response to this concern includes two parts. First, it is possible
that the creativity thresholds we study here have similar effects on those
managers and directors who guide research and innovation within firms.
Specifically, although the individual creators may not be aware of the
thresholds, the directors will be and may respond similarly to those in our
study. Further research could test this hypothesis.
Additionally, our research should be relevant not just to those who are
interested in designing optimal IP incentives but to everyone-including
managers and directors-who is trying to structure incentive regimes to
improve performance. The low threshold for obtaining a copyright implies
that firms and organizations cannot use the legal standard as a legitimate
measure of the quality of internally produced works. Accordingly,
managers will likely need to craft their own mechanisms for encouraging

Copyright Renewal Act, and the Copyright Term Extension Act as having discarded copyright's
formal procedural mechanisms).
216. See Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-GeneratedContent, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 1459,

1481 (noting a survey indicating nearly 50% of web users had created content of some kind for
others to view on the internet).
217. Id. at 1460.
218. Fromer, supra note 9, at 1779.
219. Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 38-40 (1999) (explaining that firms and other organizations tend to provide incentives to
their employees, such as awards and other recognitions); see also Fromer, supra note 9, at 1780
n.215 (noting that "[t]he need for expressive incentives in the law might be diminished in cases of
corporate creation to the extent that firms comprehensively provide optimal expressive incentives
to motivate their employees").
220. See Ofer Tur-Sinai, Beyond Incentives: Expanding the Theoretical Framework for
Patent Law Analysis, 45 AKRON L. REv. 243, 280 n. 185 (2012) (observing the "prevalent practice
among scientists and engineers to list patent applications in their resumes").
221. Similarly, creative production frequently occurs in teams, see, e.g., Anthony J. Casey &
Andres Sawicki, Copyright in Teams, 80 U. CHI. L. REv. 1683 (2013), which might also change
the effects or salience of IP thresholds.
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and measuring creativity. 222 Our research provides evidence for how those
mechanisms should be structured. Thus, even though our experiments do
not perfectly model the creative process within organizations, our findings
should be interesting to those who think about innovation in such
contexts.2 23
Another issue worth addressing is the salience of the thresholds in our
study. In real-world creativity contexts, people probably do not know
precisely how creative they have to be to qualify for IP protection.22 4 While
sophisticated inventors may understand patentability thresholds and
consciously adjust their behavior accordingly, it seems unlikely that many
or any authors do the same for copyright law. Accordingly, the high
salience of the thresholds in our experiments deviates from many real-world
scenarios. This is, however, an artifact of the current copyright law in the
United States. With thresholds set as low as they are, creators need not
bother thinking about whether their output will be sufficiently creative.
Were those thresholds set higher, as some scholars recommend,225 creators
would likely pay attention to the threshold in order to ensure that they clear
it.

A final limitation of our study design is that all of our creativity tasks
focus on the relatively rapid generation of answers. While these kinds of
short-term tasks are widely used in social-science literature on creativity,
they may miss important aspects of creativity involving the incubation and
development of ideas. 2 6 It is possible, for example, that when people are
subject to intense time pressures their behavior differs from when they have
plenty of time to think and create. 227 It is difficult for us to predict how this
difference might affect our results. Would subjects with more time focus
more on internal motivation than external incentives or would high
thresholds become even more salient? Again, further research could answer
these questions.
B.

Implications
We began this research with two opposing views of the probable
effects of patent law's high threshold on creativity. On the one hand are
222. Cf id. at 1729-35 (discussing how copyright law's right to prepare derivative works can
be used to manage team creation in firms).
223. Cf Fromer, supra note 9, at 1779-81 (maintaining that creators still need incentives to
create even if firms secure most IP rights).
224. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE
L.J. 203, 266 (2012) (calling copyright's originality threshold "vague"); Christopher A. Cotropia,
Modernizing Patent Law's Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 776
n.273 (2009) (observing that patent law's "standard for nonobviousness is very unclear").
225. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
226. We are indebted to Pam Samuelson for this observation.
227. See Teresa M. Amabile et al., Assessing the Work Environmentfor Creativity, 39 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 1154, 1161 (1996) (discussing research on time pressure and creativity).

1976

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 92:1921

legal scholars who suggest that a higher, patent-like threshold in copyright
law would promote more and better creativity as creators strove to meet it.
They argue that a higher creativity threshold in copyright law would
motivate creators to produce better works. On the other hand, some socialscience research by Amabile, Ariely, and others cautions about the effects
of high external incentives. Their research indicates that higher rewards for
creativity could crowd out intrinsic motivation or lead to choking. When
applied to the issue of creativity thresholds in IP law, their work seems to
suggest that patent law's high threshold could be undermining creative
performance relative to copyright law's trivially low threshold.
Our experiments were designed to directly test the effects of high
creativity thresholds in IP law, and our results are generally inconsistent
with the predictions based on this social-science literature and consistent
with the reasoning of the legal scholars. We see no evidence of crowding
out or choking when subjects face high patent-like thresholds. Further, we
see some evidence that high thresholds actually produce better creativity.
What are we to make of these results? First, there seems to be little
reason to fear negative effects caused by high creativity thresholds, at least
for creators who are externally motivated. This, of course, does not mean
that the research by Amabile, Ariely, and others is wrong. That research
makes clear that, when it comes to incentives and creativity, context matters
a lot. 228 Our results are consistent with this focus on context-while
directly giving subjects high monetary incentives for performance without
instructing them that they ought to be creative may reduce creativity,
structuring those incentives through IP-like probabilistic thresholds and
instructing them to act creatively may not. More research will be needed to
fully understand the psychological mechanism that distinguishes these
situations, but this suggests a promising avenue for future experiments.
This finding is important not just for IP law but also for innovation research
more broadly. It indicates that incentives structured as probabilistic
thresholds rather than as direct pay-for-performance targets and that are
clear as to the goal of performance may not undermine creativity.
Second, the experiments reported in this Article give some qualified
support to arguments of legal scholars who advocate heightening copyright
law's low creativity threshold. Clearly in Experiment 1 and somewhat less
so in Experiment 2, the higher Patent threshold resulted in better creativity
than the lower Copyright threshold. These findings give empirical backing
to the standard economic assumptions about motivation and incentives:
Higher is better.
We should be clear-our research is not close to answering with
finality the question of whether copyright law should impose a higher

228. See supra section II(A)(2).
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threshold on creators. As we explained above, scholars have offered
multiple justifications for the differences between patent and copyright
thresholds. 229 Among the various arguments for where copyright and patent
thresholds should be placed, the differing incentive effects of thresholds is
only one of many. Even if our findings gave unqualified support for the
claim that higher thresholds produce better creativity, those creativity
benefits would have to be weighed against the costs of imposing a higher
threshold, including information, error, adjudication, and psychologicalpreference costs.
Nonetheless, as a matter of direct legal implications, our research
suggests a number of further inquiries about IP incentives. First, our results
suggest that the effect of IP thresholds on creativity may vary significantly
depending on the specific type of creativity at issue. Additional research is
needed to understand fully which types of creative work are responsive to
incentives in the way that the rational-choice model predicts and which
types are less so. It is possible, for example, that the computational
creativity in Experiment 1 is more sensitive to high thresholds than the
divergent thinking verbal and figurative creativity in Experiments 2 and 3.
If so, one might posit that higher thresholds are more appropriate in patent
law than they are in copyright law. Our findings do not establish that this is
the case, but they do suggest that the question is a good target for future
research.
Relatedly, if different kinds of creativity respond differently to
thresholds and incentives, then we must ask whether patent and copyright
laws are properly calibrated across their respective subject matter. This
inquiry is particularly important given that both patent and copyright laws
concern fields of heterogeneous creativity, and in particular, both divergent
and convergent thinking.
Copyright law and patent law apply different
thresholds for protection, but each applies its own threshold with little
variation across a very wide variety of different types of creativity
(everything from motion pictures to software to shampoo bottle labels for
copyright, and a similarly wide range from pharmaceuticals to cell phone
interface designs to the business method of online one-click ordering for
patents).
Our experiments also suggest opportunities for further calibration of
creative incentives within IP fields. For example, the standard method for
increasing authors' incentives in copyright law has been to lengthen the
copyright term-that is, to give authors more rights.23 But, if creativity in

229. See supra subpart I(B).
230. See supra section II(A)(1).
231. E.g., Kelly Trimble, Comment, Are Copyright Firms Incentive Intermediaries?, 20
UCLA ENT. L. REv. 137, 142 n.19 (2013) (noting that "[i]ncreasing the copyright term duration is
a common legislative incentive tool").
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a wide enough number of areas within copyright's jurisdiction can be
stoked by higher thresholds, then it may be that raising the creativity
threshold for protection might be a more important and less expensive
method to produce valuable creative contributions. The use of higher
copyright thresholds, at least in certain areas, could "buy" more creativity at
a lower social price.
Finally, it is worth contemplating whether and how the results of our
study might have differed if our subjects had been professional or serious
amateur creators. The subjects in our experiments are not professional
creators. Moreover, given that they are choosing to participate in
Mechanical Turk, there is a strong chance that they are extrinsically rather
than intrinsically motivated. If that is correct, the sort of low threshold set
up by copyright seems to have no motivating effect versus payment of a
(very small) flat fee, at least at the level of reward (the prospect of winning
$500) offered in our experiments. This does not mean that copyright law is
not motivating creators in the real world. It is entirely possible, and indeed
likely, that if the potential reward were significantly higher, we would see
even low thresholds driving performance gains above the No Incentive
condition. With a high enough reward, we might see a sort of "tournament
effect" in which the low prospect of a very high reward may motivate
people to invest heavily in competition for success in especially lucrative
and status-conferring creative fields like acting and popular musicianship.2 32
Similarly, we suspect that if our subjects were internally motivated
professional creators working on creativity tasks that were within their
field, we would see even low thresholds driving some performance gainsperhaps because the creators value the prospect of reward not simply for its
expected monetary value but as a token of the importance of the creative
effort that the subject values intrinsically. But our findings do suggest that
at least for relatively low-stakes creativity involving nonprofessional
creators who are motivated externally, low thresholds may not create
significant incentives.
Conclusion
This study is the first to test the effects of IP laws' varying creativity
thresholds on creators' behavior.
In at least some domains, our
experimental results seem to align with standard assumptions about
incentives and motivation, in that increasing thresholds stimulate more
creativity. All in all, the work that incentives do in IP systems seems much

232. See Peter DiCola, Money from Music: Survey Evidence on Musicians' Revenue and
Lessons About Copyright Incentives, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 301, 308-09, 339 (2013) (concluding,
based on a survey of more than 5,000 musicians, that '[s]tronger copyright enforcement might
provide... [musicians] incentives to move up the income ladder in a winner-take-all kind of

market").
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more nuanced and complex than is asserted in legal scholarship.
Fundamentally, these results make clear that the central asserted rationale
for copyright and patent laws-incentives for creation of valuable worksis open to investigation. We hope that future experimental and other
empirical work will continue to shed more light on structuring incentives to
be creative.

